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1965 victims must be 
rehabilitated 
This October, our thoughts inevitably dwell once again on the events forty years ago when Indonesia 
was plunged into the darkest era in its history since becoming an independent state in 1945. 
While historians still dispute the intentions of the army 
officers who staged a coup attempt on 1 October 1965, 
kidnapping and killing a group of senior army officers, 
there is no dispute about what happened afterwards. 
Suharto, then a major-general, was not among the officers 
kidnapped, leaving him free to strike back at the conspira-
tors, most of whom were killed. He then turned his attention 
to the popular President Sukarno, gradually undermining 
his position to the point where he was able to seize the pres-
idency in March 1966. 
In the months following Suharto's intervention on 1 
October 1965, a white terror directed against the Indonesian 
Communist Party, the PK.I, wrongly blamed for the coup 
attempt - and mass organisations associated with it, led to 
hundreds of thousands of deaths. Some were at the hands of 
the military acting on Suharto's orders, and many more at 
the hands of mostly Muslim and Nationalist mobs inflamed 
by anti-communist propaganda. The killings were incited in 
particular by false allegations that members of the left-wing 
women's organisation, Gerwani, had been involved in 
sexual depravities at the base where the kidnapped generals 
were taken. 
An estimated 1.7 million people were thrown into prison 
in the six months following Suharto's intervention. Many 
men and women lost their lives in prisons across the coun-
try, at the hands of torturers or because of malnutrition. In 
the early 1970s, the number of detainees was still around 
70,000, most of whom were held without charge or trial 
until 1979. In 1969, 12,000 male prisoners were banished to 
the remote prison island of Buru where hundreds died of 
starvation or mal-treatment. Hundreds of women were 
dispatched to Plantungan, a detention centre in Central Java 
which had formerly been a leprosy colony. 
About two hundred of those arrested, mostly military 
men or senior PKI figures, were brought to trial to legit-
imise Suharto's allegation that the PK.I had organised the 
events of 1 October and were planning to depose Sukarno, 
but the vast majority were never tried. 
In the decade which followed the events of 1965, 
Indonesia was high on the list of human rights violators 
with the largest number of untried political prisoners in the 
world. No fewer than two dozen discriminatory laws and 
regulations were enacted during the Suharto era, <1-lmost all 
of which are still on the statute books. One such law is a 
resolution adopted by the upper house, the MPR, in 1966 
which outlaws the teaching of Marxism-Leninism. An 
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attempt by President Abdurrahman Wahid in 2000 to repeal 
this provoked furious protests, forcing him to give up the 
idea. 
Under growing international pressure, which further 
intensified following 
Indonesia's invasion of East 
Timor in December 1975, 
Suharto's New Order was forced 
to start releasing the prisoners 
and by the end of 1979, virtually "' 
all the prisoners had been set 
free. 
But release from prison left 
the ex-tapols (short for tahanan 
politik, political prisoner) as 
they were known, in a state of 
limbo, not free in the true sense 
of the word. Stacked against them 
was a system of discrimination 
which has dogged them, their 
offspring and even their children's 
offspring ever since. 
A Home Affairs ministerial 
decree in 1981, which provided for 
the 'comprehensive surveillance and 
political "rehabilitation"' of ex-
tapols, is still used today to legit-
imise discriminatory practices, 
particularly at the local level. The 
insertion of the initials 'ET' for ex-
tapol on identity cards helped to 
reinforce the stigma; although offi-
cially banned, similar practices still 
persist in some places. According to 
one regulation; while persons ove~ 
60 years can obtain a life-long iden- 1965 victims protesting 
tity card with a single application, 
elderly ex-tapols must renew their cards every three years. 
There are estimated to be at least two dozen laws and regu-
lations still on the statute books imposing discrimination of 
one sort or another against ex-tapols and their families and 
against the teaching of Marxism-Leninism. 
Article 60 (g) of the 2003 Law on General Elections 
banned anyone 'directly or indirectly involved' in the 
October 1965 events from standing as candidates for local, 
provincial or national assemblies. The ban was lifted by the 
Constitutional Cour.t in 2004 for being discriminatory and 
unconstitutional. But this is the only discriminatory regula-
tion to have been repealed. The Court does not have the 
power to review laws passed prior to October 1999 (when 
the Indonesian Constitution was amended for the first time) · 
yet most discriminatory laws were enacted before that date. 
A Class Action against all five post-Suharto presidents, was 
filed by a group of victims and political luminaries in 2004 
to seek compensation for the millions held without trial. 
Of all the post-Suharto presidents, only Abdurrahman 
Wahid (Gus Dur), during his presidency from October 1999 
to July 2001, took action to remove some of the most 
blatant discriminations, including the repeal of litsus 
('special investigations' to which prisoners were subjected 
to determine whether they had a 'clean environment'). He 
also made a public apology to the victims, speaking also for 
his organisation, the Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), many of 
whose members took part in the killings. 
As a consequence of these laws and regulations, the 
Indonesian State has enforced a system which breeds preju-
dice against millions of its citizens. 
The stigma persists 
This deplorable situation 
means that the stigma 
attached to being an ex-tapol 
persists against people who 
were held without due process 
and imprisoned for years 
without ever being tried and 
found guilty of anything. 
During the past few 
months, there have been 
many stories in the 
Indonesian press about 
continued stigmatisation. The 
following cases give but a taster of 
the true scale of the problem. 
Tjahyono, chair of his local 
Institute of the Struggle for the 
Rehabilitation of Victims of the 
New Order, who spent ten years in 
Nusakembangan Island prison and 
on Buru, says he won't feel free 
until he is rehabilitated and the 
historical record is rectified. His 
• children who, as infants, spent 
time in a juvenile detention centre, 
still suffer the consequences of his 
past. One daughter has 001 ( distin-
guishing her as the child of a 1965 
victim) marked on her ID card. As 
-------l!!lwO.-• a result, she has been denied any 
teaching jobs, so makes a living as 
a dressmaker. His son ·has been 
refused a job in the civil service. 
Gusti, now 85 years, has been forced, along with 175 
other ex-tapols, to relocate to Argosari, an isolated village 
in East Kalimantan. Oentung, another ex-tapol in Argosari, 
spent ten years in a string of prisons. The reason for his 
incarceration was his devotion to the Javanese traditional 
drama, ludruk. This led him to join the cultural organisa-
tion, LEKRA, which had close ties with the PKI. Another 
'inmate' of Argosari is Kasran, 81, located there because he 
joined the peasants' organisation, BTI. His children were 
taunted as 'PKI children' and 'children of a murderer' by 
their schoolmates, forcing them to quit their school. 
Verdi Ishak, the 45-year old son of the publisher Joesoef 
Ishak, is a sociologist, unable to find work in his own field; 
he now works at a foreign embassy. 
Rehabilitation, the way forward 
Forty years have passed since the events of October 
1965, and seven years have elapsed since the downfall of 
the architect of the New Order, Suharto. It is now time for 
the pain and misery inflicted on these innocent victims to 
end. 
A comprehensive act of rehabilitation is Jong overdue. 
This should consist of: 
1. A Presidential Decree granting full rehabilitation and 
restitution to all the victims of 1965 and their offspring. 
2. The restoration of the civil and legal rights of the victims 
of 1965. 
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3. The repeal of all the discriminatory laws and regulations 
introduced since 1965. 
4. The creation of an independent commission of historians 
and civil and political figures to review the historical 
records, to provide a true accounting of what happened in 
1965 and after. 
Suharto must be tried 
While millions of his victims still suffer from the continua-
tion of discrimination, Suharto the architect of their suffer-
ings, lives in secluded luxury with his children who 
enriched themselves during his years in power. In 2004, he 
faced charg~s of corruption, but the trial was adjourned on 
grounds of ill-health. In May this year, the government of 
President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono announced that no 
further action would be taken against him. 
The government should rescind this decision and 
acknowledge that the man who was responsible for the 
calamity that befell Indonesia from 1965 - 1998 should be 
brought to account for his crimes against humanity. He must 
not be allowed to go unpunished. 
This article was written by Carmel Budiardjo, founder of 
TAPOL, who spent more than three years as an untried pris-
oner, from September 1968 until January 1971. 
UPDATE 
Class Action thrown out by the court 
A Class Action which was filed by a number of organi-
sations representing victims of PKI stigmatisation earlier 
this year has been thrown out by the Central Court in 
Jakarta. [See TAPOL Bulletin 179, July 2005] 
The action was against four former Indonesian presi-
dents, Suharto, J.B. Habibie, Abdurrahman Wahid and 
Megawati Sukarnoputri and the present president, Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono. The Class Action calls for an end to 
the discriminatory laws and regulations that still remain in 
force, an end to the continued stigmatisation of the 1965 
victims and for compensation to be paid to the millions of 
people represented by the Class Action. 
It also calls on the present president to set up a team to 
assess the damages suffered by each victim. Another of its 
demands is for Indonesian history books to include to 
include a history of the killings that occurred in 1965/66 
One of the victims, Ribka Tjiptaning Proletariyati, whose 
parents were arrested, published a book about her experi-
ences as a victim. The book is titled: Aku Bangga Jadi Anak 
PKI (I am proud to be a PKI daughter). Asked recently 
about what she would be doing to pursue the issue of reha-
bilitation for the PKI victims, she said: 
'In conjunction with the commemoration of the 
Pancasila Sanctity Day on Oct. I, we are going to make a 
petition to ask the government to rehabilitate our names. If 
members of the separatist Free Aceh Movement (GAM) can 
enjoy rehabilitation, then why can't we? We have never 
asked for independence. We have never waged an armed 
rebellion against the government. All we want is the 
government to rehabilitate our families, our parents, our 
names.' 
HUMAN RIGHTS 
Indonesia ratifies two 
rights covenants 
In a major move towards upholding human . rights in 
Indonesia, the Indonesian Parliament ratified the two 
most important international covenants on human rights, 
but with one major reservation, on the question of self-
determination. 
Before ending its first one-year session in late 
September, the Parliament, elected in April last year, rati-
fied the UN's 1966 International Covenants on Civil and 
Political Rights and Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights. 
This means that for the first time, Indonesia has commit-
ted itself to eliminating all forms of restrictions on free-
dom of expression, assembly and association, threats to 
religious freedom, forced labour and discrimination in the 
workplace. 
The chairman of House Commission I on defence and 
foreign affairs, Theo Sambuaga, said that ratification 
would oblige Indonesia to 'protect the rights of its citizens 
to an international standard'. The covenants would also 
serve as an important reference for national laws already 
passed or to be passed in the future. 
Reservation on self-determination 
However, ratification also included one major reserva-
tion with regard to the right to self-determination in 
Article 1 of each covenant. Sambuaga said this meant that 
'self-determination does not apply to any parts of a united 
state and there would be no part of the Covenant that 
would go against the unitary state of the Republic of 
Indonesia'. Clearly the Indonesian Parliament was deter-
mined not to provide legitimacy to the demand for inde-
pendence, widely supported in West Papua. 
Foreign Minister Hassan Wirayuda said that ratification 
means that the international community could hold 
Indonesia accountable for implementation of the two 
covenants and Indonesia will now be required to submit 
biennial reports on their implementation. 
However, Indonesian human rights activists have criti-
cised the ratification as 'half-hearted'. Ifdhal Kasim, 
director ofELSAM, the Institute for Policy Research and 
Advocacy, complained that ratification had excluded two 
optional protocols which were as important as other 
clauses in the Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
The two excluded protocols were on mechanisms for 
victims of human rights violations to individually claim 
for rights restoration, and on the abolition of capital 
punishment. [Jakarta Post, 1 October 2005] 
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Masterminds of Munir's murder are 
beyond the law 
More than a year after the murder of Indonesia's foremost human rights activist Munir, Indonesia is no nearer to 
bringing the true perpetrators to justice. A man now on trial is just the most exposed collaborator in th~ conspiracy 
which plotted this wicked crime. A/act-finding team set up by the President found evidence of a conspiracy involv-
ing the country's formidable intelligence agency, BIN, as well as senior officials of the national airline, Garuda. . 
In August this year, the trial began in Jakarta of 
Pollycarpus Budihari Priyanto, charged with the murder of 
Munir. Although Pollycarpus, a pilot with Garuda, certainly 
played a role in the murder for which he should be 
punished, it is becoming increasingly evident that his trial 
will be as far as the case goes, while the men who master-
minded the crime will not be brought to justice. Moreover, 
the trial could foreclose further action to bring the guilty 
men to justice: BIN has a reputation for ruthlessness and it 
is more than likely that the police who are in charge of the 
investigation will shy away from taking on such a formida-
ble institution. 
Usman Hamid, a member of the Fact-Finding Team 
(TPF) which investigated the murder earlier this year, was 
concerned that efforts to reveal the role of BIN would be 
thwarted. 'Some top officials and police will resist efforts to 
solve this case. We are sure to encounter obstacles and 
attempts at a cover-up ... I am convinced that police are 
being pressured.' 
Attention has focused on the man who headed the intel-
ligence agency at the time Munir was murdered, retired 
Lt.General Hendropriyono. He has made no secret of his 
contempt for the investigations. The TPF identified him as 
a key figure but he failed to show up when summoned for 
questioning. He and his aides have even filed charges 
against members of the TPF for defamation. 
Munir, 38 years old, died on his way to Amsterdam on 7 
September 2004, on board Garuda flight 974. He was going 
to The Netherlands to take a one-year course in human 
rights law. Dutch forensic scientists who undertook the 
autopsy of his body announced that he had died from a 
massive dose of more than 500 mgs of arsenic, four times 
the lethal dose. It was following this revelation and the 
outcry that ensued that President Yudhoyono announced his 
intention to establish a fact-finding investigation team, in 
addition to the police investigations. 
Munir was best known for his fearless pursuit of the 
Indonesian military because of their operations in many 
parts of the country. In the months prior to his death, he had 
received many death threats but never allowed them to 
stand in the way of his quest for justice and his condemna-
tion of the atmosphere of impunity which has protected 
human rights violators in Indonesia for so many years. In 
the end he fell victim to well-laid plans by his opponents 
determined to annihilate him and send a message to other 
human rights activists. 
Recently a document has been discovered which 
describes four ways in which he could be eliminated. They 
include sorcery, an accident and the possibility of putting an 
end to his life while on a trip abroad. 
The poison which killed Munir was added to the 
welcome drink he was served at the start of the flight from 
Jakarta to Singapore. During the second leg, he started 
vomiting violently. A doctor on board gave him a tranquil-
liser which sent him to sleep but when a stewardess 
approached him shortly before landing, she discovered that 
he was dead. 
The Pollycarpus trial 
From the start, Pollycarpus was a prime suspect. Before 
· the flight, he had been in touch with Munir's wife to estab-
lish exactly when Munir would travel. He was on board 
Flight 974, flying as an off-duty pilot and invited Munir to 
move from economy class to a business class seat soon after 
take-off from Jakarta. This clearly facilitated the murderous 
intentions of the sponsors. Pollycarpus travelled only as far 
as Singapore. A Garuda flight operations support officer, 
giving testimony in court, said she had assigned Pollycarpus 
as an extra crew member on the flight, on the instructions of 
the airline's President-Director, IndraSetiawan. Pollycarpus 
is known to have been in regular communication with BIN 
officials, having made no fewer than 35 calls to their ex-
directory numbers before and after the murder. 
The indictment alleges that the defendants motives for 
murdering Munir were that, as a 'staunch nationalist' he 
viewed Munir 'as an obstacle to government programmes 
and wanted him eliminated'. In court, his lawyer, 
Mohammad Assegaf accused the prosecutors of fabricating 
these motives because of their inability to arrest the true 
murderer. He argued that his client was being used as a 
scapegoat. 
Two other Garuda employees who were members of the 
crew on Flight 974 have also been named as suspects but 
they are not under arrest. 
For the past year, Munir's widow, Suciwati, has devoted 
all her energies to seeking the truth about the murder of her 
husband, calling for the true perpetrators to be brought to 
justice. In the past few months she has travelled the length 
and breadth of the country as well as going abroad, to the 
US and Europe, to muster support for her campaign. In a 
recent statement, she said: 
"I'm not just talking about the death of my husband. In 
the future, it could endanger human rights and democracy in 
Indonesia. Even an internationally known activist can be 
murdered. The message is: 'I can kill Munir and I can kill 
you."' She has repeated her conviction that his murder was 
highly political and has herself been subjected to intimida-
tion and death threats, in an attempt to force her to abandon 
her efforts on his behalf. 
Along with Herawati, the wife of Pollycarpus, Suciwati 
made an impassioned plea for Pollycarpus to reveal the 
truth about his involvement in the murder and to name other 
players. 
According to Human Rights Watch director, Brad 
Adams: 'Munir's murder represents a return to the bad old 
days in Indonesia when independent human rights activists 
Continued on page 21 
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Aceh: give peace a chance 
The peace agreement signed on 15 August in Helsinki between the Indonesian government and GAM, the Free Aceh 
Movement, is a milestone in Indonesian history. Although this accord is not the first to have been concluded between 
Jakarta and the secessionist movement in Aceh, there are substantial differences which make this a development of 
major political significance. 
There was a feeling of great relief in. Aceh on 15 August 
that lasting peace was finally within reach as news circu-
lated that a peace agreement, in the form of a Memorandum 
of Undrestanding(MoU), had been signed by the two 
warring parties. This reflected the people's longing for 
peace after nearly thirty years of conflict. Days before the 
signing of the deal, peace events were organised in many 
places. On 14 August, students organised a joint prayer 
gathering at the Baiturrachman Grand Mosque in Banda 
Aceh, after which white roses were handed out to members 
of the public as an expression of the desire for peace. 
There have been two previous peace agreements in Aceh. 
In 2000, an agreement for a humanitarian pause was 
concluded, while in 2002 an accord known as COHA or the 
Cessation of Hostilities Agreement, was signed. However, 
both were short-lived and collapsed because of a lack of 
political will. 
Political will is crucial 
The success or failure of any peace agreement is primar-
ily dependent on the political goodwill of the two sides. 
Peace processes in other parts of the world, in Sri Lanka or 
Northern Ireland for example, have all had their ups and 
downs. And as these other processes have shown, it is not 
an easy matter to establish lasting peace in a situation where 
conflict has existed for years or even decades. 
The signs are that this time, the MoU has come about 
because of political goodwill on both sides. GAM entered 
the talks with a decision to abandon its demand for inde-
pendence while the Jakarta government acknowledged that 
a negotiated settlement was the only way to achieve a 
sustainable peace. Over the years, military operations have 
only brought devastation and misery for the population 
while armed resistance has been at the heart of GAM's 
campaign. 
It gradually became apparent that Vice-President Yusuf 
Kalla along with several senior officials had initiated steps 
towards a peace accord months before the tsunami disaster 
struck Aceh on 26 December last year. A few days before 
the tsunami, agreement had been reached to start negotia-
tions. The devastation wrought by the tsunami reinforced 
this and eight months later the Helsinki deal was signed. 
Several factors helped to ensure that a peace agreement 
would be concluded. First and foremost was the tsunami 
which both GAM and the government recognised as a turn-
ing-point because of the need to engage in massive recon-
struction and rehabilitation. In addition, strong international 
pressure to start talks again was an important factor. Huge 
funds had been pledged (around US$4 billion) for recon-
struction in Aceh. This commitment would not only finance 
the physical reconstruction but would help put to rest the 
trauma which has gripped the population for almost 30 
years. 
TN! troops boarding ships to leave Aceh 
It is likely that in some respects common positions were 
reached too swiftly, without considering the political impli-
cations of the decisions taken, especially with regard to 
implementation. A wide range of issues were on the agenda, 
including the complex problem of amnesty' for all political 
prisoners and GAM combatants. 
There were other controversial issues such as self-
govemment and political participation for the Acehnese. 
One of the most contentious issues, an agreement by Jakarta 
to allow Acehnese local parties to be set up contravenes 
Indonesian election law at present in force. (The law 
requires that political parties must have branches in at least 
half of the country's provinces.) 
Another controversial issue emerged in July when it was 
announced that GAM members would be given houses and 
2 to 3 hectares of land. Ultra-nationalist circles in Jakarta 
were quick to accuse the government of rewarding rebels 
for their armed struggle. Because of the many contentious 
issues, the Helsinki proceedings were often shrouded in 
secrecy to avoid provoking right-wing opposition in 
Parliament or among the general public. ·. 
TNI andAceh 
Another key factor is the attitude of the TNI, the 
Indonesian armed forces. In the previous truces, the TNI 
played an obstructive role. They regarded negotiations with 
GAM as a humiliation; in their view, rebels should be dealt 
with by force. The TNI also used counterinsurgency tactics 
including training paramilitary youths. Militia groups 
backed by local military commands played a destructive 
role during the 2000 and 2002 ceasefires and were the 
determining factor that led to the collapse of those agree-
ments .. 
Bearing these past experiences in miqd, the attitude of 
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the top-brass was of crucial importance. In general, the 
majority of senior officers in Cilangkap, the TNI headquar-
ters, can be expected to be unhappy with the talks. But the 
present TNI leadership, notably the commander-in-chief, 
General Endriartono Sutarto, has taken a highly unusual 
position. On several occasions he expressed the opinion that 
the peace process was a political matter and the armed 
forces would abide by the decisions taken by the govern-
ment. In July, when it became apparent that a peace treaty 
would be signed, he went further, saying that if GAM gave 
up their weapons, TNI troops would be withdrawn from 
Aceh. As it turns out, the peace accord stipulated that all 
non-organic troops (special troops outside the provincial 
territorial command) should be withdrawn. 
In a two-day seminar on Aceh held in Jakarta on 29 and 
30 July, co-sponsored by TAPOL, Major-General Bambang 
Darmono, the last military commander for special opera-
tions in Aceh also stated that a negotiated settlement would 
be the best way to end the conflict. Known as a hardliner, 
Major-General Bambang Darmono, was a member of the 
Indonesian delegation at the Helsinki talks and was also 
present at the signing of the treaty on 15 August. 
While key generals like Darmono have shown a remark-
able shift since two years ago, several prominent retired 
generals have responded with sabre-rattling language. 
Retired General Wiranto, the top-ranking officer in the final 
days of Suharto, compared the Helsinki deal to a soccer 
match with GAM winning 1 ~O. Similar language has come 
from retired General Kiki Syahnakri, a former commander 
in East Timor. Such views are probably shared by other offi-
cers, though nothing is known about what the present army 
chief-of-staff General Djoko Santoso or other senior offi-
cers think. 
It is fortunate that General Endriartono Sutarto currently 
holds the top position. He became commander during the 
Megawati presidency and was retained by President Susilo 
Bambang Yudhoyono (SBY) although he is by now well 
beyond retirement age. He has been kept on because of his 
moderate views and his acceptance of civilian supremacy. 
Army Chief-of-Staff General Ryamizard Ryacudu, a notori-
ous hardliner, was unceremoniously sacked by SBY and 
replaced by Djoko Santoso a rather colourless officer who 
nonetheless has a good track record of ending the violence 
in Maluku. The removal of Ryamizard Ryacudu was a 
master stroke; the Helsinki agreement would not have 
proceeded so smoothly had he been in charge of the army. 
The first positive step was taken at the end of August 
when the TNI withdrew two so-called non-organic battal-
ions in a show of support for the MoU. 
A comprehensive document 
Up to the very last moment, changes and amendments 
were being made to the final draft of the MoU. Insiders 
leaked sections of the draft which made it clear that it was 
much more than a simple cease fire or peace agreement. 
It is a comprehensive document dealing with the political 
and economic future of the region. The dynamics of the 
talks were very interesting. Every time agreement was 
reached on a particular issue, the Indonesian delegation had 
to consult the Vice-President to check whether it would be 
acceptable to the legislature. 
Indonesia's chief negotiators, Hamid Awaluddin, 
Minister of Justice and Human Rights, and Sofyan Djalil, 
Minister for Communications, are members of the Yusuf 
Kalla team which also includes Farid Husein, a high-rank-
ing civil servant. . 
They were all involved for months and had been m touch 
with GAM since January 2004, at a time when military 
operations were still raging in Aceh. Apart from being .a 
seasoned politician, Yusuf Kalla is also a successful busi-
ness man; he handled his dealings with local politicians 
rather like he would handle a business deal. 
Although not discussed in great detail, it was clear that 
GAM combatants in the mountains, GAM refugees in 
Malaysia and elsewhere, and GAM ex-political prisoners 
would be re-integrated through a financial package which 
includes housing and eventual job opportunities. 
Background to the MoU 
One section of the MoU deals with the ceasefire and the 
establishment and role of the monitoring mission organised 
by the European Union and ASEAN. A further section deals 
with issues such as governing of Aceh, the political partici-
pation of the Acehnese and the running of the economy of 
Aceh and there is also a rather skimpy section dealing with 
the rule of law and human rights. 
The negotiations in Helsinki began at the end of January 
and agreement was reached on 15 August after only six 
rounds of talks. This was quite an achievement, an indica-
tion of the determination of both sides to reach a compre-
hensive settlement to a bitter conflict which had lasted for 
nearly thirty years. 
It became clear after the second round that GAM had 
dropped its key demand for independence but wanted some-
thing substantial instead in the political and economic 
sphere. The governing of Aceh, political participation of the 
Acehnese and how far they would be able to run their own 
economic affairs gradually became critically important. 
This led the talks into new pastures, exceeding the bounds 
of Indonesia's autonomy law. 
GAM rejected the NAD (Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam) 
special autonomy package which originated from the 
Habibie Presidency in the first year after the Suharto dicta-
torship. This was a period of opportunity which provided 
new openings against the backdrop of the stalemate which 
had previously prevailed in Indonesian politics. However 
the special autonomy deal never materialised and conse-
quently, GAM demanded a different kind of self gover-
nance. 
Finally an agreement was reached on these issues under 
the heading Political participation which states in Article 1: 
'As soon as possible and not later than one year from the 
signing of this MoU, GoI (Government of Indonesia) agrees 
to and will facilitate the establishment of Aceh based polit-
ical parties that meet national criteria. Understanding the 
aspirations of Acehnese people for local political parties, 
GoI will create, within one year or at the latest 18 months 
from the signing of this MoU, the political and legal condi-
tions for the establishment of local political parties in Aceh 
in consultation with Parliament. The timely implementation 
of this MoU will contribute positively to this end.' 
Although Indonesian election laws do not allow local 
political parties to exist, strong lobbying by Yusuf Kalla and 
the heads of parliamentary fractions secured a majority in 
favour of a future vote to change these laws. 
April 2006 is fixed as the time when elections will ·take 
place in Aceh for the governor, district and sub-district 
chiefs. Under the Law on the Governing of Aceh, the 
Acehnese will have the right to nominate candidates for all 
official positions. It is possible for someone to stand as an 
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independent, provided they obtain the required support. A 
candidate for governor needs 30,000 supporters. 
The economic sector 
Four articles on the economy provide the basis for far-
reaching economic responsibilities in the post-conflict era, 
to secure external loans and set a local interest rate as well 
as setting and raising taxes for internal purposes. Aceh will 
have jurisdiction over natural resources in the surrounding 
sea and will be entitled to 70 per cent of the revenues from 
hydrocarbon deposits and other natural resources on land 
and in the territorial waters. 
The reconstruction of Aceh after the ·tsunami will play a 
crucial role in peace-building: The population will soon feel 
the difference once economic aid starts pouring in. Rebuilt 
houses, increased economic opportunities and a sharply 
decreased violence will hopefully create conditions for a 
lasting peace. 
The democratisation process is more likely to succeed if 
it goes hand in hand with increased economic activity and 
people feel that their daily lives are improving at all levels. 
But contradictory factors will also be at work. The 
Indonesian economy is in a mess because of the on-going 
oil crisis and the weak performance of the Cabinet in tack-
ling daily problems. Furthermore, the Aceh peace process 
comes with a whopping price tag, in particular for the rein-
tegration of former GAM members, who will be provided 
with houses, land and job opportunities. If the US$4 billion 
from the international community is utilised for peace-
building efforts such as re-integration, the peace process 
will have a solid foundation. 
COHAandMoU 
The MoU is much more than a cease fire agreement and 
conclusions and lessons can been drawn from the COHA 
experience. But the bottom line is that there seems to be the 
necessary goodwill to implement the provisions which 
cover just a few sheets of paper. 
The COHA (Cessation of Hostilities Agreement), signed 
in Geneva in December 2002, never stood a chance as both 
sides were wary and suspicious. It lasted only six months 
and collapsed in May 2003 when the Megawati government 
declared martial law in Aceh and launched a massive mili-
tary operation. 
Despite the good intentions, the COHA agreement was 
doomed because of its flawed implementation. A peace 
building process was supposed to take place after the sign-
ing of the agreement but nothing happened. Several bloody 
incidents occurred, including the torching of a local peace 
office in Takengon which spread like wildfire, sapping the 
already low confidence of the Acehnese people. 
Despite the unfavourable political conditions, the COHA 
agreement had certain advantages as compared to the MoU. 
The facilitator of COHA, the Humanitarian Dialogue 
Centre (HDC), made strenuous efforts to advocate the peace 
process with the Acehnese. Many Acehnese were actively 
involved in this process, while the MoU still has to establish 
a presence with the public. 
The MoU facilitator, the Crisis Management Institute 
(CMI) in Finland, has so far limited itself to facilitating the 
talks. Advocacy still needs to be undertaken and there are 
still many questions about which organisations should 
shoulder this responsibility. There is an urgency to inform 
the population about implementing complex issues like 
political participation, economic opportunities and the rein-
ACEH 
I 
tegration of the different categories of GAM members. 
Some aspects of implementation require the adoption of 
new regulations or amendments of existing laws, while a 
new law on the governing of Aceh will probably not take 
shape before further deliberations between the officials of 
the two sides, in April 2006. 
While the CMI is not involved in the implementation 
process, other organisations are being approached by the 
Indonesian government. The International Organisation for 
Migration (IOM) which is already present and active in 
post-tsunami Aceh, will handle the difficult task of helping 
GAM members re-integrate into society. 
More than 1,400 prisoners released 
The general amnesty and unconditional release of 1,424 
Acehnese political prisoners is unprecedented in Indonesian 
history and the Indonesian government should be congratu-
lated for taking this action, as a token of good will. 
Security arrangements in the COHA and MoU also 
reflect the political conditions of each period. The role of 
the military was dominant in the COHA agreement while 
the MoU relies far more on the police to uphold internal law 
and order in Aceh. As for the de-commissioning of arms, 
under COHA, GAM weapons were placed in special go-
downs under Indonesian authority while the MoU agree-
ment stipulates that arms, ammunition and explosives must 
be destroyed. Each phase of de-commissioning will be 
followed by the withdrawal of Indonesian troops. 
Many stumbling blocks 
So far, the peace process has proceeded smoothly with 
majority support in Parliament and the MPR, the People's 
Congress. But implementation faces many problems; many 
technicalities have not been worked out and it is likely that 
the 220 foreigners monitoring the process .will have their 
work cut out to handle the many tasks. 
During the long-drawn-out conflict, a war economy 
emerged in Aceh. Illegal activities such as the drugs trade 
and arms selling have been lucrative. GAM units have 
collected taxes from the population, a practice that must 
now end. Groups which benefit from such activities are 
expected to try to sabotage the peace process. 
The tsunami made a deep impact on the economy; while 
on the one hand, reconstruction activities will generate new 
economic prospects, there are also negative influences. The 
arrival of many foreign aid workers has sent food, housing 
and transportation prices soaring. The official unemploy-
ment rate in Aceh is 27 per cent and if the local authorities 
do not act speedily, the present optimism will decline. 
Since arrangements have been made to compensate 
GAM members, the families of soldiers who lost their lives 
may also expect compensation from the State. Whereas 
some troops were responsible for egregious human rights 
violations and benefited from legal or illegal business activ-
ities, many ordinary soldiers - regarded by the population as 
an army of occupation were brutalised by their experiences 
or killed in a conflict which claimed over 14,000 civilian 
lives. 
But posting in Aceh had its positive side for the troops, 
many of whom indulged in lawful or unlawful business. 
Those troops who are withdrawn in accordance with the 
peace agreement should be deployed for the defence of the 
country and not sent elsewhere as non-organic troops. 
Moves to re-locate these troops to West Papua would be 
totally unacceptable. 
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Peace in Aceh one month on 
One month after the peace agreement between GAM and the Indonesian Government w'!s signed in 
Helsinki, 229 monitors from European and ASEAN countries have been sent to monitor the_u11:ple_menta-
tion of the accord designed to solve over 30 years of conflict. The first phase of decommisswmng has 
finished and appears to have proceeded relatively smoothly. 
During this first phase of GAM's disarmament, 243 
weapons were handed over to the Aceh Monitoring Mission 
(AMM), and destroyed. This is a considerable achievement 
given that the first step only mandated the handover of 210 
weapons. The first handovers were in Banda Aceh, then 
Pidie and Bireuen; no major incidents occurred. 
At the same time, troop withdrawals have begun. A total 
of 6,669 non-organic troops have now left Aceh. The non-
organic police forces withdrawn include 1,300 Brimob 
(crack troops). · 
The AMM has opened offices in 11 districts, including its 
head office in Banda Aceh, and has four mobile teams. 
While there are still some reports of human rights viola-
tions, the indications are that there has been a drastic reduc-
tion in violence on the ground. 
In general, things are moving fast. Nonetheless, it is 
evident that insufficient work is being done to prepare 
support mechanisms for affected communities. The delays 
in spreading information to the people and getting reinte-
gration processes underway demonstrate clearly how 
important work is l:5eing left behind by other elements of the 
process. 
Informing the public 
A critical buildirtg block for peace is keeping everyone 
informed. With ex-rebels unclear about their rights, receiv-
ing communities concerned about the impact of rebels 
returning, and tsunami-affected communities worried that 
the housing and land needs of the former GAM members 
could take precedence over their own needs, this is an 
essential part of the peace process. 
To this end, a team has been established under the 
Department for Information and Communications 
(InfoKom). The Tim Sosialisasi Aceh Damai, or Core 
Socialisation Team, has a specific remit to inform the 
Acehnese population of the terms of the MoU 
(Memorandum of Understanding), which sets out the terms 
of the peace accord. 
However, one month after the signing of the accord, 
public education seems stuck at the level of general points 
from the MoU. The key message delivered so far has reiter-
ated the importance of peace, and asked the Acehnese to 
support the process. But this fails to address the real infor-
mation needs of the population. The Acehnese have already 
clearly demonstrated their enthusiasm for the peace 
process. People have been waiting for decades for a sustain-
able peace to be implemented. There is no need to spend 
vast resources encouraging people to support the idea of 
peace. 
To be more effective, the dissemination of information 
should move beyond the general points of the MoU and 
address people's hopes, fears and expectations. There are 
some concerns among Acehnese about how the 
Demobilisation, Demilitarisation and Rehabilitation (DDR) 
and peace processes will be implemented. With a popula-
tion still largely homeless, lacking basic amenities and 
unable to resume a semblance of normality, the provision of 
money, homes and land to demobilised GAM fighters 
inevitably raises concerns about giving less priority to the 
needs of people made homeless by the tsunami. 
To address this, attention should focus on planning the 
reconstruction of villages to which former combatants will 
return. The team has to consider incentives for the popula-
tion, indicating for instance that the villages of former 
combatants may receive some additional reconstruction and 
development funds, as is planned by some agencies. 
Moving this process beyond the broad brush strokes of 
purpose and intention is hugely important if those in charge 
are serious about winning public involvement in the process 
and making people feel that they will really benefit from it. 
It has to tackle potential problems on the ground, at grass-
roots level, before they become serious. 
Reintegration Project 
The other neglected element at this stage is the reintegra-
tion of former combatants. This is also absolutely critical 
for the successful implementation of the peace process. 
According to the MoU, all victims of the conflict in Aceh 
will receive some form of compensation, while former 
political detainees will be granted amnesty. 
However, as with the dissemination of information, 
details about the reintegration strategy remain unclear and 
have yet to get off the ground. There is no clear information, 
for example, about what has happened to former detainees 
who have now returned to Aceh after receiving amnesty, 
although many are believed to have rejoined their families. 
There is no information in the public domain as to where 
most of the released and amnestied prisoners are now 
living. 
The reasons behind this, and the GAM caution it high-
lights, are evident in the problems encountered in getting 
former combatants to register for the reintegration 
programme and the benefits it offers. From the perspective 
of many former GAM combatants, the period between 
weapons handover and the reintegration programmes is 
simply too long. This is an understandable element of any 
transition period, but there are inherent dangers. 
Special attention should be paid to the fact that the 
weapons handover on 15 September was only the first step 
in a long process. The next step will take place after a 
month, and thereafter at monthly intervals until December. 
But December is over three months away. Reintegration, 
therefore, is evidently not running parallel with the process 
of decommissioning. 
An additional set of challenges arises from the fact that 
public education and reintegration are going to be even 
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more challenging if the government remains the only deci-
sion-making agency. The fact that the MoU vests the prin-
cipal responsibility in the government is a significant flaw 
in an otherwise holistic strategy. Given the sensitivity of 
reintegration, it is necessary to have decision-making actors 
in addition to the state involved. 
Demilitarization and Human Rights 
Particular attention should be paid to the lack of clarity 
surrounding the mechanisms for the withdrawal of the non-
organic troops and police from Aceh. 
Under the MoU, both sides have agreed to end all acts of 
violence. Responsibility for demilitarisation lies with both 
sides. GAM will demobilize its 3,000 troops, it will not 
wear uniform nor will it display its symbols after the MoU 
is implemented. Decommissioning will be undertaken by 
GAM and 840 factory-made weapons will be handed over 
to the AMM for destruction. 
The government's parallel commitment is to the with-
drawal of non-organic police and military forces from Aceh. 
This withdrawal is scheduled to take place at the same time 
as GAM's weapons handovers, in four monthly stages. As 
already noted, the first stage, involving 6,669 army and 
1,300 police personnel, is complete. 
ACEH 
In a 'conventional' security set up, law and order is in the 
hands of the Police. But in the Aceh context, the police are 
very unpopular with local communities because their 
behaviour mirrored that of the armed forces. Many stopping 
places used by bus and truck drivers to rest and take refresh-
ments along the western and eastern coasts have served 
principally as police posts. Special attention needs to be 
given to BRIMOB units responsible for counter-insurgency 
operations in Aceh. Most of them have been involved in 
joint operations with the army against GAM. 
Moreover, the question of past human rights violations is 
inadequately addressed in the MoU. In Indonesia generally, 
the culture of impunity established under the Suharto 
regime shows no sign of diminishing. One of the principal 
obstacles to effective democratisation has been this ongoing 
impunity. And in this context, it is a matter of serious 
concern that, while the MoU talks of compensation for 
victims of the Acehnese conflict, there is no indication of 
what precisely is meant by a 'victim'. Nor is there any sense 
of what constitutes compensation. Sustainable peace cannot 
overlook, or be vague about, the terms needed to achieve 
justice. If the MoU is to succeed, such things must be dealt 
with from the outset. 
First phase of prisoner reintegration 
On 30 August, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono signed Presidential Decree 2212005 granting an unprecedented 
amnesty to all Acehnese prisoners detained for their alleged involvement in the activities of the Free Aceh Movement, 
GAM. This welcome move arose from a commitment made in the Helsinki Peace Agreement. 
Earlier, on Indonesia's Independence day, 17 August, 
some 200 prisoners had been set free. Over 1,400 more 
prisoners from several prisons in Aceh and many parts of 
Java were then unconditionally released by the end of 
August. As an act of good faith, the Indonesian Government 
promised to release the prisoners within two weeks of sign-
ing the peace deal. All the prisoners had been tried in the 
past two years on charges of treason or rebellion. 
The amnesty and unconditional release mean that the 
social, political and economic rights and the right to partic-
ipate freely in the political processes in Aceh and elsewhere 
in Indonesia are restored to the former prisoners. 
In total around 2,000 prisoners were tried and sentenced. 
Of the 400 remaining in detention, 116 cases have been 
identified as disputed cases awaiting resolution while the 
rest will be classified into different undefined categories. 
Most of the 116 disputed cases relate to alleged GAM 
combatants who used or hoarded firearms. A solution will 
be sought through further negotiations between GAM and 
the Indonesian authorities. 
Some well-known public figures are among those 
released. They include GAM negotiators Teungku Usman 
Lampoh Awe, Teuku Kamaruzaman, Amni bin Marzuki, 
and Nasruddin who were involved in previous peace talks 
that broke down in 2003, and activists such as Muhammad 
Nazar, chair of SIRA, the organisation that campaigned for 
a referendum in Aceh in the late nineties. 
Unfair trials 
TAPOL has campaigned for years for the release of pris-
oners allegedly associated with GAM. The trials were 
grossly unfair and failed to live up to international stan-
dards. Most lasted not more than two or three sessions and 
severe sentences, in some cases up to 14 years, were passed, 
while the defendants' right to legal counsel and other due 
process rights were seriously restricted. 
TAPOL welcomes the release of the prisoners as a 
promising start to the implementation of the peace agree-
ment. Presidential Decree 22/2005 showed good will on the 
part of the Indonesian Government and will hopefully be 
followed by further measures stipulated in the MoU 
between the two sides. 
The MoU includes a special section on reintegration into 
society of all persons granted amnesty. SpeCial measures are 
to be taken, including the provision of economic facilities 
for former combatants, released political prisoners and 
affected civilians. A special Reintegration Fund will be 
administered by the authorities in Aceh and those released 
will be provided with housing and land. 
Most of the former political prisoners are believed to 
have now re-joined their families, including those who 
received sentences of more than three years and were 
shipped to Java, although exact information about there 
whereabouts is still sketchy. No incidents have been 
reported. An initial sum of two million rupiahs was paid by 
the authorities to the 1400 prisoners released by the end of 
August. Further arrangements will follow. · 
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Growing intolerance among religious groups 
While the Bali bombing atrocities on 1 October(see box) were perpetrated by a small group of intfividua!s 
bent on using any means including terrorism to express their political views, other recent !ncidents m 
urban centres in Java indicate a disturbing wider trend towards religious intolerance. Indonesia non: faces 
acts of aggression by several Muslim groups against other religions. Indonesian Islam has a reputation for 
being moderate and compatible with democratic principles. But as in other parts of the world, some groups . 
now preach intolerance and reject democracy and pluralism. 
In July a wave of attacks occurred in Bogor and Jakarta 
against a Muslim organisation, Ahmadiyah, which has 
enjoyed a strong following since the thirties and is known 
for its liberal religious views. A group named FPI (Front 
Pembela Islam, Front for the Defence of Islam) was in the 
forefront of the attacks. In September another series of 
attacks against Ahmadiyah took place in Cianjur, near 
Bandung, the capital of West Java. 
These incidents were widely covered in the Indonesian 
media, which also reported strong protests against the 
attacks by mainstream organisations and Muslim intellectu-
als. The issue became the subject of heated debate in several 
seminars, which also attracted much attention across the 
political spectrum in Indonesia. 
Some weeks later, mobs launched attacks in West Java, 
calling for seven churches to close down. They alleged that 
the churches had not been granted permission to be in the 
area and were becoming a nuisance to local people. These 
attacks also provoked much criticism and anger among 
mainstream religious organisations and more discussions 
ensued. According to the law, all places of worship require 
official permission. 
A group known JIL (Jaringan Islam Liberal, Islam 
Liberal Network) was also targeted. JIL was formed in 2001 
to promote a spirit of tolerance among religious groups, and 
attracted much attention, thanks to its activism, appearances 
on radio talk shows and in newspaper articles. But it also 
has had to confront a wave of intolerance, with several 
small groups calling for the JIL to be banned. Far from 
supporting these demands, the local community in the 
neighbourhood came to the JIL's support, and helped to 
protect its office against attacks. 
-Edict by Muslim Council 
The vituperative attacks by the FPI came in the wake of 
a series of fatwas or religious edicts, from Indonesia's 
powerful Islamic scholars' council, the MUI. On July 29, 
the council issued a number of fatwas condemning 'liberal-
ism, secularism, and pluralism'. The eleven fatwas were 
read out at a meeting of 400 Islamic scholars from across 
the country; among other things, they condemned inter-faith 
prayers and marriages between people of different religions. 
The MUI was set up during the Suharto dictatorship. Its 
original purpose was to curb the Muslim religion, which 
Suharto saw as a threat to his rule, and re-shape the religion 
along lines that would cease to represent a threat. But over 
time, it has installed itself as an institution, not unlike the 
Vatican, regulating Islam in a way that conforms with a 
largely conservative outlook. 
The growing conservatism among leading ulamas in the 
MUI is a reflection of a similar strain of conservatism 
affecting the two main religious organisations in Indonesia, 
Muhammadiyah and Nahdlatul Ulama (NU), which 
together represent the majority of Indonesian Muslims. The 
man who now heads Muhammadiyah as its elected chair-
man, Din Syamsuddin, is a prominent member of MUI, and 
holds strongly conservative views, unlike former 
Muhammadiyah leaders. PKB (Partai Kebangkitan 
Bangsa, Party of National Reawakening), the political wing 
of NU, also reflects this shift towards conservatism. While 
the PKB has maintained a spirit of inclusiveness, opening 
its doors to non-Muslims, a splinter group has now emerged 
that restricts membership to Muslims only. · 
Since the arrival of Islam from the Middle East in the 
eleventh century, through traders from India, Islam has 
existed peacefully, side by side with older beliefs, such as 
Hinduism, Buddhism as well as animist practices. The vast 
majority of Indonesia's 193 million Muslims who comprise 
88 percent of the population, engage in a moderate form of 
Islam. The current trend towards conservatism and intoler-
ance is gradually changing the face of Islam in Indonesia. 
New style Abangan-Santri divide 
Both the NU and Muhamadiyah were founded in Java, 
where the abangan-santri dichotomy existed. The term 
santri applies to the more pious Muslims while the term 
abangan applies to those who are nominally Muslim but 
generally live a more secular life, and often owe allegiance 
to nationalist, that is to say, secular parties. 
With the emergence of the world-wide phenomenon of 
radicalism within Islam, many young Indonesian Muslims 
were recruited to join the fight against communism in 
Afghanistan, against the perceived evils of Zionism and 
against American imperialism. They underwent very rigor-
ous training, including military training, in Pakistan, 
Afghanistan and elsewhere. Much of this recruitment was 
directed towards abangans, who became born-again 
Muslims with extremist views. The predominant feature of 
these people is a literal interpretation of the Qur'an and 
intolerance towards people with other views. 
Such training would certainly have helped to produce 
individuals inspired by the idea of becoming martyrs as the 
way to paradise and engaging in acts of terror as suicide 
bombers. The horrific bombing in Bali in October is 
believed to have been the work of three such men, whose 
severed heads have been displayed on television and in the 
media. The police are hoping that this gruesome display 
will help them to identify the bombers and lead them to the 
masterminds of these atrocities. This sombre development 
could well mean that Indonesia is likely to experience new 
acts of terror in the coming weeks or months. 
A similar trend has also occurred globally among 
Christians with the emergence of a string of new, bom-
again congregations. As yet, these trends have not found a 
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footing in Indonesia: The Protestant church in Indonesia 
came into · being under the influence of Dutch and German 
missionaries but in the last 25 years, a number of American 
Protestant denominations have embedded .themselves in 
many parts of the country. 
While new and minuscule radical Muslim groups have 
been showing their fist towards other religious groups, the 
new Christian congregations, also very . radical in their 
views, are as yet hardly visible· in Indonesia. As is widely 
acknowledged, George W. Bush owes his electoral victory 
to the support of the fundamentalist Christian vote. But 
there are no signs that the Bush presidency is wildly popu-
lar in Indonesia or that the religious and neocon overtones 
of his administration are reverberating in Indonesia. 
Secular leaders face a challenge 
Indonesia is always mentioned as being the country with 
the largest Muslim population in the world. As in other 
nation states with a majority of Muslims, notably Turkey 
and Pakistan, Indonesian Muslims have also had their share 
of political difficulties. A constant feature has been the 
conflict between secular and religious leaders. 
From 1945 till 1998, Indonesia was ruled by two secular 
head of states, Sukarno and Suharto. While Sukarno epito-
mised the typical third world leader of the fifties, like 
Nasser, Nkrumah and Nehru, Suharto was the prototype of 
Cold War dictators with strong anti-Communist and anti-
Islam credentials. Both men were abangan Muslims and 
were, in different ways, political failures. Neither of them 
gained power through democratic elections. Sukarno 
assumed the presidency with the support of the existing 
political parties and the armed forces under Guided 
Democracy. Suharto seized power as the result of a fero-
cious onslaught against the left, in particular the Indonesian 
Communist Party, and staged five-yearly elections, during 
which a de-politicised population gave him the legitimacy 
he needed to remain in power. 
For the first time in its history, democratic elections were 
held in 2004, resulting in the election of Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono as President. Muslim parties and candidates did 
not fare at all well, and once again, the world's largest 
Muslim nation has shown its preference for an abangan to 
take the helm. 
During the first year of his ~residency, Susilo h~s 
displayed a somewhat bemused attitude towards the reli-
gious strife that has erupted in part~ of the country. He ~as 
ignored demands for Jemaah Islam1yah, a group espousmg 
views not unlike those of Al Quai'da, .to be banned, perhaps 
out of fear that this would alienate Muslim opinions and be 
contrary to the democratic principles which now hold sway 
in the country. 
Attacks like those mentioned above, perpetrated by 
groups which see themselves as religio~s purists, ass~ing 
the robes of dangerous anti-apostasy, still express the views 
of a small minority. However, unless these trends are 
addressed properly by Indonesian civil socieo/ as well as by 
those in authority, they could become a wornsom~ threat to 
the country's secular traditions. Rather than takmg these 
groups on, NGOs need to speak up const~ndy in favour ~f 
religious tolerance. They need to engage m a well-coordi-
nated programme to appea~ to the coun~'s youth, to coun-
teract a campaign of recruitment now bemg undertaken by 
militants. 
I 
ISLAM 
Second Bali bombing atrocity 
On the evening of Saturday 1 October several bombs 
exploded on the tourist island of Bali, killing at least 23 
people including three of the apparent perpetrators, and 
injuring dozens more. The atrocity occurred just three 
years after a series of bombs killed 202 people in Kuta, at 
the heart of Bali's tourist industry on 12 October 2002. 
The latest attacks took place as this Bulletin was going 
to press, so detailed comment is not possible. See 
however the separate article on 'Growing intolerance 
among religious groups'. 
At 7.30 in the evening, when bars and cafes were busy 
serving foreign tourists on the popular Jimbaran Beach, a 
bomb exploded in the Menega Cafe, between t~e 
candlelit tables. As diners fled, another bomb went off m 
the Nyoman Cafe next door. Within minutes more bombs 
exploded three miles away at the Raja noodles and steak 
restaurant in Kuta. Most of the victims were Indonesians 
in the eateries or nearby; others were from Australia and 
elsewhere. 
Bali was just recovering from the impact of the first 
atrocity. A question on many people's minds now is: can 
Bali recover this time or is the damage to its reputation as 
a haven for tourists, back-packers and surfers irretriev-
ably damaged? 
On this occasion, the perpetrators w~re suicide 
bombers with explosives strapped round their waists. 
They are believed to be from the militant group, Jemaah 
Islamiyah, blamed for the first atrocity, or a splinter 
group, and may have targeted Bali for several reasons. 
Balinese are Hindus, unlike the vast majority of 
Indonesians who are Muslims. Eighty per cent of the 
Balinese workforce are involved in one way or another in 
the tourist trade which Muslim fanatics regard as being 
morally reprehensible. Furthermore, Bali is well-known 
throughout the world, meaning that a bombing outrage 
there would attract plenty of international attention. 
Added to this is the likely motive of destabilising the 
country's democratically elected, secular government. 
According to initial investigations, three suicide bombers 
were involved. Three severed heads were found in the 
wreckage, believed to be those of the perp_etrators. 
This is the fourth bombing atrocity Indonesia has had 
to endure. Following the first Bali bombing, attacks took 
place in Jakarta, at the Marriott Hotel in August 2003 and 
outside the Australian embassy in September 2004. Many 
Indonesians were among the casualties on both occa-
sions, especially outside the Australian embassy. The 
police made a number of arrests. Two of the men tried 
were given death sentences. 
The Indonesian police have identified two Malaysian 
. militants as prime suspects. Azahari bin Rusin and 
Noordin Mohammed Top have been South,.East Asia's 
most wanted men since the Bali bombings of 2002. Both 
men are still at large. · 
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Economy in deep trouble 
The fact that 1 October was the 40th anniversary of Suharto's rise to power was.prf!bably th_e last thing on 
many people's minds when the government chose that day to announce. a hefty nse.m the pnce of fuel. The 
bombing of tourist attractions i'} Bali on the same d_ay and thf!.appallmg loss of lif~ (see box on pa_ge 11) 
will have confronted Jakarta with a host of economic and political problems requiring urgent solution. 
Oil price increase causes 
disarray 
For years, the Indonesian economy has I 
borne the burden of huge fuel subsidies, 
which intensified dramatically when the 
world price of oil skyrocketed from around 
$25 a barrel in the first half of the year to the 
present level of $65. Since this year's and 
next year's budgets were based on the 
assumption of $40 a barrel, this plunged the 
government's fiscal plans into disarray. The 
government had no option but to raise its 
assumption to between $50 and $60 a barrel 
but global developments could soon deal 
another blow to.these assumptions 
Until recently, Indonesia has been a 
major oil-exporting country, but under-
investment in the industry and a huge 
upsurge in the demand for petrol have 
turned things around, with imports now IMF chief Camdessus watches on as Suharto signs 
exceeding exports. Hence, the cost of 
importing petroleum has borne down heavily on the coun-
try's foreign exchange reserves. 
The bombs in Bali are bound to have an impact on the 
Indonesian economy, which depends heavily on tourism. 
The decision taken by the government of Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono (SBY) to increase the price of fuel by a whop-
ping 126 per cent came after weeks of soaring prices on the 
world market and volatility in the foreign exchange market. 
This saw the rupiah slump in value from less than 9,000 to 
the dollar to more than 11,000, then settle at around 10,500. 
Earlier this year, in March, the SBY government was forced 
to increase the price of fuel by 29 per cent, pledging at the 
time that there would be no further increases this year. This 
was a promise it would now have to break. 
Fuel subsidies have been maintained since the Suharto 
. era, in an effort to keep the cost of living low. The effect has 
been primarily to subsidise car owners. Travelling along the 
traffic-clogged streets of Jakarta, brand new SUV s are 
visible everywhere, an ungainly contrast to the hovels and 
shabby eating stalls which line the narrow streets. Weaving 
in between the cars are even more motorbikes; their 
combined effect on the level of pollution is what makes 
Jakarta the most heavily polluted city in South-East Asia. 
Far too little attention has been given to increasing public 
transport. 
Compensation for poorest families 
The price hike was accompanied by a decision to provide 
compensation to 15.5 million families which would be 
hardest hit by the policy. They are to receive a three-
monthly sum of Rp 300,000 (around $30). It remains to be 
seen whether this well-intentioned policy runs smoothly 
and the handout reaches the intended recipients in full, and 
whether it will fully compensate for across-the-board price 
increases of basic commodities as well as transport. 
The fuel subsidies also helped millions of poor house-
holds by keeping down the price of kerosene, which is used 
extensively for cooking by families with no electricity, as 
well as by street traders selling food. However, while the 
price of premium gasoline was increased by 87 .5 per cent, 
the price of kerosene went up by a massive 185.71 per cent. 
Some analysts have warned that the price increases may 
force labour-intensive industries to close down, resulting in 
a major increase in unemployment. 
Commenting on the fuel subsidies, The Jakarta Post [20 
August 2005] said that 'money that would have been better 
spent on other basic services, including education, health 
and defence, was being squandered to keep cars on the 
road' . 
Even before the price hike was official, thousands of 
people demonstrated against the planned increases. 
According to commentators, the decision to raise the price 
of fuel was taken at the insistence of Vice-President Yusuf 
Kalla, a wealthy businessman, who reportedly used his 
muscle to persuade members of Parliament not to oppose 
the decision. 
The combination of the fall of the rupiah and the hike in 
fuel prices has pushed inflation to around 10 per cent, and 
has had a negative impact on overall economic growth. 
The manufacturing sector has also been hit by investors 
shutting down factories in Indonesia and shifting to other 
South-East Asian countries. The reason given is the perva-
sive nature of corruption and the corrosive bureaucratic 
nightmare involved in obtaining licences from local author-
ities. All this has only added to the level of unemployment, 
in a country where no social security exists. 
Continued on page 21 
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Tribal Council rejects special autonomy law 
The Papuan Tribal Council (Dewan Adat Papua) has firmly rejected a law on special autonomy because 
of the government's failure to implement the legislation. In August, thousands rallied throughout West 
Papua to oppose the law. Soon after, a report from Biak revealed a systematic pattern of violence and intim-
idation while a major investigation conducted by Australian scholars exposed a policy bordering on geno-
cide. · 
The law on Special Autonomy was adopted in 2001 in an 
attempt to grant West Papuans a greater say over their lives 
and to persuade them to abandon their support for indepen-
dence. But the law has made virtually no impact on their 
lives and rumours are rife tha~ autonomy funds have been 
dissipated by corruption. According to Rev. Sofyan Yoman, 
head of the Papuan Baptist Church, some of the money has 
been used to finance military operations. 
Dissatisfaction with the law culminated in the Dewan 
Adat taking to the streets on 12 August in many parts of 
West Papua, calling on local administrations to 'hand back' 
the law to Jakarta. Between 15,000 and 20,000 people 
demonstrated in Jayapura. Many of them took part in a 
'long march' of 17 kms from Abepura to Jayapura to support 
Dewan Adat leaders who delivered a message to the 
regional assembly rejecting the special autonomy law. 
Similar peaceful demonstrations took place in other 
towns with 2,000 people involved in Manokwari, 1,000 in 
Biak and Wamena, and 2,000 in Sorong, amongst others. 
Dewan Adat, an upcoming power 
The Dewan Adat emerged in the wake of the Second 
Papuan People's Congress in May,.June 2000. The 
Congress was attended by 3,000 delegates and made a stir-
ring call for independence. Since its establishment in 2000, 
the Dewan Adat has won support throughout West Papua. It 
holds plenary sessions annually, each time in a different 
region. In the past four years, these sessions have been 
attended by around 300 people representing the many 
indigenous groups. 
This year's annual meeting took place in February, in 
Manokwari. The Dewan Adat decided to set a deadline of 
15 August for the government to implement the special 
autonomy law, failing which the local administrations 
would be urged to hand back the law. The demonstrations 
were in fact held on 12 August, following a decision to 
bring forward the action for security reasons, and to avoid 
being over-shadowed by events connected with Indonesia's 
national day on 17 August. 
A Dewan Adat plenary session in June reviewed the 
government's actions and noted that the government had not 
responded to the 15 August deadline announcement. It 
issued a communique drawing attention to the government's 
comprehensive failures. These were: the continued exis-
tence of the unlawfully established West Irian Jaya 
province, problems surrounding the installation of the 
Papuan Consultative Assembly, the MRP, inadequate repre-
sentation of West Papua's 253 tribes, the presence of mili-
tary personnel not regulated or controlled by. the MRP as 
required by law, numerous human rights abuses, mostly 
because of a difference in the interpretation of Papuan 
history, and the persistence of appalling living co~ditions 
which had not improved since the law was enacted m 2001. 
According to an analysis of the Dewan Adat distributed 
by the Papua Lobby, based in The Netherlands, this new 
Papuans handing back the special autonomy law 
body is a sign of the growing importance of organised civil 
society in Papua. The Papua Lobby states that Dewan Adat 
is committed to the principle of holding consultations with 
the authorities and the security forces on their intentions to 
peacefully express disagreement with, or opposition to, 
government policies. 
Dewan Adat advocates the principles of non-violence 
and democracy while the two themes of the protest action 
on 12 August were: Special Autonomy of Papua Has Failed 
and The Lives of People in Papua are Threatened. 
Violence and intimidation in Biak 
Although the actions organised by the Dewan Adat were 
allowed to proceed without any clampdown by the security 
forces, some violence and intimidation was conducted 
against the population, much of it aimed at persuading 
people not to take part in protests against the special auton-
omy law. 
A report received from the island of Biak which runs into 
five and a half pages of closely-typed text, portrays a series 
of actions by the local army, police and militia indicative of 
a comprehensive intelligence operation. The report, drawn 
up by the Biak branch of the Dewan Adat, is entitled: 
'Political Situation in West Papua: Attitude of the 
Army/Police and Militia in the District of Biak Numfor'. 
The document reveals that the Biak branch of BAKIN 
(Intelligence Co-ordination Agency) set up by presidential 
decision on 10 June 2005 was under instructions to focus on 
local bureaucrats from the governor down. This followed 
the dispatch from April to August to the region of troops 
from outside West Papua. The security forces were under 
orders to conduct intelligence operations with the support of 
local militias. 
The following are just a selection of the many actions · 
and incidents that, according to the report, occurred in Biak 
during the run-up to and in the wake of the Dewan Adat's 
action on 12 August. 
The intelligence agents employed four tactics: disguising 
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themselves as street traders; engaging in commercial activ-
ities such as the purchase and sale of fish and travelling 
from towns to the villages; taking jobs at government and 
private offices; and becoming security guards at public 
enterprises. 
On 19 May, the Dewan Adat was informed that the police 
force in the sub-district of Sabar Miokre was to be replaced 
by a 100-strong unidentified army unit. The news spread a 
sense of great unease among the population whose past 
experience of having soldiers in their midst was one of 
chaos and loss of life. 
On 1 June, local troops shot at peoples' homes, aiming at 
the rooftops. 
On 13 June, the Jayapura military command instructed 
the South Biak military to arrest six persons, four of whom 
were Dewan Adat officials. On the following day, it 
ordered the arrest of four persons active in TPM, the armed 
wing of the OPM. [It is not known whether these ten 
persons are still in custody.] 
On 15-16 June, on the pretext of cleaning up the markets, 
district and local officials, local assembly members, and 
security force personnel used hose pipes against traders 
when closing time approached. The security forces later 
announced that traders would from then on have to close 
their stalls at 6pm. [Evening trading is widespread in 
markets throughout Indonesia.] 
On five consecutive days, Dewan Adat activists were 
beaten for allegedly passing round information about the 
action planned for 15 August. 
The hoisting of the Morning Star flag by militias. 
[Dewan Adat had instructed their followers not to fly the 
flag, to avoid provoking the security forces.] 
TNI units based in the village of Dedifu set up command 
posts within three hundred metres of the forest, to carry out 
house-to-house searches. 
Local people were panic-stricken by army patrols which 
opened fire in the forest. Forest-dwellers fled their gardens 
in fright and some women and children fell and sustained 
injuries. 
Eleven Papuan spies (whose names are given) were 
frequently involved in discussions with the army and police 
to monitor the political situation and orchestrate demos to 
provoke the security forces and target Papuans. Plans were ' 
made with these people to disrupt the action planned for 15 
August. 
At a meeting held between local figures and the military, 
it was decided to set up a Joint Team to warn people against 
taking part in the 15 August action. This meant that the mili-
tary were doing things that were properly the responsibility 
of the local executive. What business was it of the TNI to 
convene such meetings, the report asks. 
From 1-5 August, the army and police conducted sweep-
ings throughout Biak and imposed a tight grip around 
villages and kampungs. Kopassus troops took part in these 
operations. 
At a ceremony to mark the anniversary of the Indonesian 
air force, the Biak air force commander said he would resist 
a recent decision by the US House of Representatives to 
include supportive language on West Papua in the State 
Department Authorization Act passed in July(see box on 
page 15) and would oppose nations which support a Free 
Papua. 
On 12 August, a show of force was organised to intimi-
date local people. 
On 13 August, a naval battleship was used to drive local 
fishermen from their traditional fishing grounds. 
On 14 August, while people were at prayer, fully-armed 
troops entered the plape of worship and arrested a . congre-
gant, spreading consternation among the congregation. 
On 20 and 21 August, a meeting at the local korem 
(district command) decided to launch a 'Killing Operation' 
against those who support a Free Papua. Three Biak Dewan 
Adat leaders were mentioned as the targets. 
On 23 August, a local militia member informed 
ELSHAM that he had been invited to a meeting between the 
military and local pro-government NGOs. Before entering 
the meeting, they were carefully searched and all writing 
equipment was confiscated. Besides targeting local Dewan 
Adat leaders, the meeting decided to target a local pop 
group called Beyuser set up in April to popularise tradi- · 
tional Papuan music which has been virtually extinguished. 
The names of a number of Dewan Adat members had been 
placed on the 'wanted' list. 
In conclusion, ELSHAM Biak and the Biak Dewan Adat, 
who compiled this report, said that the information had been 
compiled from very reliable sources and from the victims 
themselves. They said that if this situation was allowed to 
continue, tensions would be further strained which could 
lead to casualties. They appealed to the domestic and inter-
national community: 
1. To exert strong pressure on the TNI, the PoliCe and the 
militias to halt their repressive activities. 
2.To provide protection to the indigenous people throughout 
West Papua. 
The report was dated 26 Aougust 2005 . 
Australian academics on genocide 
A study by two Australian academics, the result of three 
years investigation in West Papua, was recently made 
public. Entitled Genocide in West Papua?: The role of the 
Indonesian state apparatus and a current needs assessment 
of the Papuan people, it warns that concerns 'if not acted 
upon, may pose serious threats to the survival of the indige-
nous people ... '. 
The study covers 'threats posed by the Indonesian mili-
tary to the province's stability, the recent increase in large-
scale military campaigns which are decimating highland 
tribal communities, the HIV I AIDS explosion and persistent 
underdevelopment in the face of rapid and threatening 
demographic transition in which the Papuans face becom-
ing a minority in their own land.' 
The report is dedicated to Papua's leading human rights 
activist, John Rumbiak, who was instrumental in commis-
sioning and planning the investigation but who suffered a 
stroke in February this year, from which he is still recover-
mg. 
The term 'silent genocide' is used to describe the series of 
incidents orchestrated by the military. Villages are 
destroyed by arson blamed on the Free Papua Movement, 
OPM, which then force the villagers to flee their homes and 
gardens and suffer from starvation and exposure. The latest 
example is the Puncak Jaya incident [see article in TAPOL 
Bulletin no. 178, March 2005], which forced more than six 
thousand people to flee. 
The report draws attention to high rates of mother and 
child mortality, and the uncontrolled spread of HIV/Aids. 
'As health and security of the population are supposed to be 
the responsibility of the government,' the report writes, 
'Papuans can be forgiven for thinking that the government's 
policy towards Papua is one of ethnocide.' 
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Several sections address the problems of illegal logging 
whose perpetrators are protected by the military, and the 
security forces' involvement in business activity. It 
mentions reconstruction projects now run by the army. A 
senior army officer serving in Wamena, John Bauna, is 
behind the construction of a local multi-storey shopping 
centre. This is likely to be a magnet for consumerism at a 
time when indigenous Papuans are unable to compete with 
migrants from Indonesia and are becoming increasingly 
isolated and excluded from the cash economy. 
In Manokwari, the TNI are building and training local 
militias in Satgas Merah Putih (Red and White Special 
Forces). They have two bases in Manokwari in areas where 
there are many transmigrants and Muslims.' One area is 
called SB7 and the other Orang Sebari .. Weapons and 
ammunition are being smuggled in: 'But what makes me 
angry,' says the report's source, 'is that when people reported 
this to the authorities, there was no .. .. attempt to confiscate 
the weapons. So I am convinced that the TNI is preparing 
militias ... and that at some stage these militias will become 
a force used to attack the community, as happened in East 
Timor.' 
It is widely acknowledged that West Papua has the high-
est rate of HIV I AIDS in Indonesia. The study says that 
besides legal brothels, where the women undergo regular 
medical examination, there are many illegal brothels that 
offer their services much more cheaply. The network of 
brothels is linked to the trade in gaharu (sandalwood) 
which is sold by local people for prices far below those in 
the Middle East. The source, an Indonesian lawyer, said that 
gaharu is being exchanged for sex. . 
In a section titled A New Apartheid?, the study pomts out 
that freedom of movement within Papua is severely 
restricted. Papuans require a surat jalan (travel permit) 
when traveling to their own villages. Papuans who are 
members of the army or police are 4sually not allowed to . 
carry weapons, unlike Indo~esian sol~iers. ~ile migrants 
from elsewhere in Indonesia can easily get Jobs, Papuans 
often wait years for a job. This is called 'structural discrim-
ination over the right to work' . 
Demographic Transition . . 
The report draws heavily on the fi.ndmgs of Michael 
Rumbiak, now deceased, a former leadmg ~emographer at 
Papua's Cendrawasih University. He pomte~ out that 
Indonesia's Family Planning programme (KB) is .seen ~y 
Papuans as a depopulation programme. ,While this 
programme aims to restrict families to two c~Ildren, H~V, 
the lack of adequate health services, and the high mortality 
rate among women and children is cutting Papua's popula-
tion growth to zero. Rumbiak recommende~ that the 
programme in Papua should set a target per family ?f five 
children with subsidies to support family economic and 
health needs. 
According to Rumbiak, HIV/AIDS cases in ~apua 'are on 
a sharp increase - a huge, hidden, slow and silent but sure 
threat'. He warned that there are many hidden sufferers a~d 
recommended strong government policies .to halt this 
growth. The main source of the disease is Thai fishermen, 
but calls by church and community groups to send these 
fishermen home have had no effect. . . . 
The demographer also warned that transm1grat10n pol~­
cies have impoverished the local people who have los~ their 
traditional land rights. He takes the example of Arso m the 
Jayapura district where the population has grown from 
WEST PAPUA 
Historic language in US bill 
At the end of July, the US House of Representatives 
approved a bill, which if passed into ~aw, could ~n~rease 
international pressure on Indonesia to re-v1~1t t?e 
contested 'Act of Free Choice' and to address its dire 
human rights record in West Papua. 
The Foreign Relations Authorization Act for 20?6 and 
2007 included momentous language on Indonesia and 
West Papua submitted by Congressmen Faleomavaega, a 
prominent advocate for West Papua, and Donald Payne. 
While recognising the advances in de!11ocratisati?n 
made by Indonesia in recent years, the bill notes W_It.h 
grave concern a lack of progress in the reform of the !111li-
tary, the continued commission of serious human nghts 
violations by security forces personnel, and the govern-
ment's failure to hold soldiers and police to account for 
their crimes. 
In relation to West Papua, the House finds that the 1969 
Act of Free Choice, which led to West Papua's incorpora-
tion into Indonesia took place 'in circumstances that were 
subject to both ov~rt and covert forms of manipulati~n'. 
Since then 'indigenous Papuans have suffered extensive 
human rights abuses, natural resource exploitation, envi-
ronmental degradation, and commercial dominance by 
immigrant communities,' it says. 
The Bill goes on to find that 'the promise of special 
autonomy has not been effectively realised and has been 
undermined in its implementation.' 
Furthermore, 'Rather than demilitarizing its approach, 
Indonesia has reportedly sent thousands of additional 
troops to Papua, and military operations in the central 
highlands since the fall of 2004 h~ve displaced thous~nds 
of civilians into very vulnerable circumstances, contribut-
ing further to mistrust of the central government by many 
indigenous Papuans.' 
The bill requires the Secretary of State, within 180 days 
of the law being passed, to submit reports on the Act of 
Free Choice and on the implementation of special auton-
omy to include assessments of the extent of access to 
West Papua, troop levels and US efforts to promote 
human rights. 
Following the House approval of the bill, Falemavaega 
said: 'For too long, the cries of the West Papuans have 
fallen on deaf ears, and I pray that with the concerted 
attention of the Congress the international community 
will support this effort.' 
The legislation still has to be passed by the Senate, 
whose recent record on such matters is not promising. 
Despite this, the bill has already had a major impact, forc-
ing Indonesia to address international concerns about 
West Papua and defend its abject record in the territory. 
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Abepura killers escape justice 
The Papuan people's sense of injustice and resentment at Indonesian rule is likely to have been strength-
ened by the acquittal in September of two senior police officers accused of allowing the killing of three 
Papuan students and the torture of dozens more in Abepura in December 2000. The Papuans' lack off aith 
in the justice system will have been compounded by the knowledge that by contrast, Papuan activists face 
lengthy jail terms for peace/ ul protest and non-violent political activities. 
'Unspeakably shocking' abuse human rights and identified 25 suspects, including the 
In the early hours of 7 December 2000, police assisted by provincial police chief Brig-Gen Sylvanus Wenas, his. 
locally-based forces of Indonesia's notorious paramilitary deputy, Brig-Gen Moersoetidarno, Brimob commander, 
police mobile brigade, Brimob, raided three student dormi- Brig-Gen Johny Waismal Usman and Jayapura police 
tories in Abepura, close to the provincial capital Jayapura. commander Superintendent Daud Sihombing [see TAPOL 
The raids followed an attack by unidentified persons on the Bulletin, no 162, p. 18]. 
local police station and autonomy office, which left a police The case was referred to Indonesia's Attorney General 
officer and a security guard dead. and after much delay two of the senior officers, Johny 
During the raids, one student, Elkius Suhunaib, was shot Usman and Daud Sihombing, were charged with crimes 
dead by the police. Over a hundred against humanity under Indonesia's Law 
others, including pregnant women and 26/2000 on human rights courts. The law 
children, were detained and subjected to ' ,,.,· had been passed shortly before the Abepura 
horrific beatings, violent assaults, killings to address serious crimes committed 
torture and racist abuse. Two students, in East Timar and to establish a permanent 
Ori Doronggi and Johny Karunggu, died human rights court with jurisdiction over 
in police custody; another, Agus Kabak, future cases of gross human rights viola-
was left with permanent injuries and a tions. 
fourth student, Arnold Mundo Soklayo, The officers were separately charged with 
died later in Jayapura as a result of his command responsibility for the abuses 
injuries. committed by their subordinates. The trials 
The assaults took place in the pres- took place in the new human rights court in 
ence of a Swiss journalist, Oswald Iten, Makassar, South Sulawesi, which has juris-
who had been arrested for taking photos diction over West Papua. No explanation 
of a pro-independence demonstration. has been forthcoming as to why none of the 
He later described what he saw in other suspects named by Komnas HAM 
graphic terms: were charged. 
' ... what I saw there was unspeakably 
shocking. About half a dozen policemen 
were swinging their clubs at bodies that 
Verdi~ts prompt anger and 
despair 
The lengthy trials concluded after sixteen were lying on the floor and, oddly Papuans protesting against the ocquitals 
months with not guilty verdicts on 8 and 9 
September 2005. In the case of Brig-Gen. Johny Waismal 
Usman, the court found that there was evidence of abuse 
and torture by Brimob. However, it was not systematic and 
there was no clear evidence that Usman ordered the attacks: 
'We found that the defendant's actions at the time were his 
response as a superior. His action was in accordance with 
standard operational procedures thus we have decided to set 
him free of all charges.' ['Cop cleared of rights abuse 
charges, Jakarta Post, 7 September 2005]. Furthermore, 
the abuse was not covered by Law 26/2000 and should 
instead have given rise to charges under Indonesia's ordi-
nary criminal law, the court held. One judge dissented argu-
ing that the offences were covered by Law 26/2000. 
enough, did not cry out; at most, only 
soft groans issued from them. After a few long seconds, a 
guard saw me looking and struck his club against the bars 
of the cell block door. I quickly went back to my usual spot, 
from where I could still see the clubs, staffs and split 
bamboo whips at their work. Their ends were smeared with 
blood, and blood sprayed the walls all the way up to the 
ceiling. Sometimes I saw the policemen hopping up on 
benches, continuing to strike blows from there or jumping 
back down onto the bodies below ... ' [Neue Zurcher Zeitung, 
22 December 2000]. 
Many of those detained were from Papua's central high-
lands. It is believed they may have been targeted as revenge 
for the killing of Indonesian settlers in the highland town of 
Wamena two months earlier [see TAPOL Bulletin, no 160, 
p. 20]. There was no evidence that the students were 
involved in the attack on the Abepura police station and 
autonomy office and they were all subsequently released. 
Indonesia's National Commission on Human Rights, 
Komnas HAM, despite encountering police obstruction and 
witness intimidation, produced a damning report. It 
concluded that the case constituted a gross violation of 
Daud Sihombing was found to have been aware of the 
actions of the police under his command and could have 
been held responsible, but not by the human rights court 
under Law 26/2000. 
The a~ow:icements of the acquittals, prompted wide-
spread d1sbehef, anger and despair. Several Papuans 
attending the hearings broke into tears and screams. A 
woman dressed in traditional costume climbed onto a chair 
and yelled at the judges for being unfair. By contrast, 
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Brimob officers attending the trial of Johny Waismal 
Usman celebrated by singing Brimob marching songs. 
Interviewed on Radio New Zealand International, 
Oswald Iten, the Swiss journalist who witnessed the abuse, 
was in no doubt about Daud Sihombing's involvement: 
'He being the commander of police, he having the office 
right above the cells where it happened. He would pass by 
this torture chamber every day several times. So I have 
absolutely no doubt that he was the man who had all the 
responsibility on this.' [Radio New Zealand International, 
19 September 2005] 
Gross injustice 
Benny Wenda, Head of DeMMak, the Koteka Tribal 
Assembly and international lobbyist with the Free West 
Papua Campaign, Oxford, UK, described the outcome as 
yet another insult to the Papuan people and evidence that 
they mean nothing to Indonesia as human beings: 
'Have you seen photos of the bruised and battered faces 
of my people, kicked and beaten by Indonesian Police in 
their student hostel in Abepura in December 2000? I didn't 
just see photos, I saw some of my brothers and sisters with 
my own eyes. Their faces were so mangled I could hardly 
Brigadier General Johny Wainal in court 
recognise them. I saw their blood mixed with their tears. I 
also spent time with the families crying for their loved ones 
murdered by the Police on that horrible day. 
'Now Indonesia has added yet another injustice and insult 
to my people. Over the past few days, we Paptians have 
heard that Indonesia's so-called justice system has acquitted 
. the two senior Indonesian police officers responsible for the 
Abepura massacre because the brutal killing of three 
unarmed Papuans (two while already in police custody) and 
the cruel beating of at least 99 other innocent Papuan 
students do not meet the necessary criteria for "gross human 
tights violations". 
'We have seen during 42 years of illegal occupation that 
Papuan lives mean nothing to Indonesia. We know that 
Indonesia just wants our land, our trees, our gold and our 
WEST PAPUA 
oil, but not us human beings ['Indonesia: Do you even think 
of us Papuans as human beings', statement issued 12 
September 2005]. 
A group of Indonesian NGOs, including PBHI, Kontras, 
Imparsial and Elsam, calling themselves the Coalition of 
Civil Society for the Abepura Case urged the Attorney 
General's office to appeal. It also called for a Judicial 
Commission to investigate the handling of the case, and 
demanded compensation for the victims. It questioned the 
length of the trials (Law 26/2000 says they should last no 
longer than 6 months), the venue, saying it should have 
been in Papua, and the fact that the suspects remained free 
and were even promoted during the trials ['Acquittal of 
senior officers condemned', Jakarta Post, 10 September 
2005]. 
Impunity alive and well 
The Catholic Institute for International Relations, CIIR, 
condemned the rulings as ' .. . further proof that the 
Indonesian government is neither willing nor able to bring 
human rights abusers in the Indonesian security forces to 
book ... and that impunity is alive and well' ['Church agency 
condemns Indonesian human rights decision', Ekklesia, UK, 
14 September 2005]. 
Carmel Budiardjo for TAPOL said: 'Even 
under a political system where democracy 
and justice are supposed to prevail, the 
Indonesian legal system still perpetuates 
impunity. It is shameful that human rights 
abuses by the ... police in West Papua will go 
I 
unpunished. This shows a lack of political 
will to change from the bad old days of the 
Suharto regime and sets a precedent for more 
verdicts protecting human rights abuses.' 
[Press release, 16 September 2005]. 
The case will only intensify the Papuan's 
bitterness at the Indonesian justice system 
and fuel support for independence. It also 
raises wider questions about Indonesia's 
commitment to protecting human rights and 
strengthening the rule of law. 
The substance of Law 26/2000 and the 
decision to prosecute under that law in partic-
ular deserve critical examination. The law 
was rushed through to pre-empt possible 
moves by the international community to 
establish an international tribunal for East 
Timor. To date, proceedings brought under 
the law have resulted in the acquittal of 17 
out of 18 defendants charged with crimes 
against humanity in East Timor, the acquittal of 14 soldiers 
accused of involvement in the 1984 Tanjung Priok massacre 
[see separate item] and now the not guilty verdicts in the 
Abepura case. 
One problem is that the law only allows for the prosecu-
tion of gross violations of human rights amounting to geno-
cide or crimes against humanity. The burden of proof on the 
prosecution is accordingly extremely high. This was high-
lighted before the start of the Abepura trials by Abdul 
Hakim Nusantara, the head of Komnas HAM. He was 
concerned that many serious offences would go unpunished 
because of the need to prove they were part of a 'systematic 
and widespread' attack on the civilian population, a key 
element of crimes against humanity. 
'I think such an extraordinary standard should be 
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reviewed as it is too demanding a requirement to meet,' he 
said. 'Torture and rape and extrajudicial killings are serious 
offences and should be heard in a human rights court even 
though they may not be systematic and widespread.' 
['General to Face Indonesia's Rights Court', Sydney 
Morning Herald/The Age, 8 May 2004] 
This is an issue which should be addressed by the 
Indonesian justice ministry and parliament as a matter of 
urgency. 
Iniquitous punishments 
The Papuans' despair at the lack of accountability of 
security forces involved in serious crimes will have been 
made more acute by the knowledge that Papuans are thrown 
into jail for peaceful protests and other non-violent political 
activities. 
The iniquitous punishments handed down to Papuans 
contrast starkly with the treatment of prisoners in other 
parts of Indonesia. Just three months after two activists, 
Flep Karma and Yusak Pakage were jailed for 15 and 10 
years respectively for organising peaceful celebrations and 
flying the Papuan flag [see TAPOL Bulletin, no 179, p. 20], 
20 of those convicted for the October 2002 Bali bombing 
outrage were granted remissions of their sentences to mark 
Indonesia's independence day on 17 August. 
On 30 August, President Yudhoyono signed a presiden-
tial decree providing for the release of all Acehnese prison-
ers involved in the activities of the Free Aceh Movement 
[see separate item]. TAPOL welcomed this development, 
but is deeply disturbed that no similar move is being made 
in relation to Papuan prisoners. Many have been convicted 
under Indonesia's draconian anti-sedition laws for flag rais-
ing or being members of the Free Papua Movement, OPM. 
They include eight men transferred from prison in Wamena 
to Makassar in South Sulawesi, thousands of kilometres 
from home where they have limited or no access to their 
lawyers and family. 
President Yudhoyono has promised a political solution to 
the problem of West Papua. If he is to make progress he 
must address as a matter of urgency the need for a fair and 
equitable system of justice which does not criminalise 
peaceful political activities and ensures that human rights 
violators are punished appropriately for their crimes. 
Yusak Pakage: 1 December action 
"peaceful" 
Statement from Abepura Prison, 27th September. 
PAPUANS have been independent since 1st December 
1961, but this has been manipulated by the Indonesian, 
Dutch and United States governments and watched over by 
the United Nations. The manipulation created a victory for 
Indonesia. Since 1st May 1963, the government of 
Indonesia has come to colonize, kill, kidnap, rape and 
oppress the Papuans. 
Right up to this minute, our cries and tears are still 
continuing to fall onto the Land of West Papua. 
Indonesia is a democracy. We raised the Bintang Kejora 
flag [Morning Star flag] with the aim of encouraging 
dialogue between the people of West Papua and the govern-
ment of Indonesia. There is no other more respectable way 
than through dialogue. We should sit together and have a 
democratic dialogue to find a solution to end the killings, 
the oppression and the injustice which have occurred 
systematically on West Papuan land. 
Continued from page 15 
1 000 in 1970 to 20 000 in 2000; transmigrants were more n~erous and strong, pushing Papuans into the barren hills. 
Taking all these points together, Rumbiak said it wou~d lead 
to depopulation and the extinction of Papuans m the 
villages unless radical counter-measures are adopted. 
The report includes interviews with a numbe~ of West 
Papuans including Simon Morin, member of Parliament, a 
victim of the Wasior human rights abuses case, Mama 
Yosepha Alomang, an environmentalist who won the 
Goldman environmental award in 2000, the Reverend 
Herman Awom, deputy chair of Evangelical Church in 
Papua, Lena, an HIV counsellor and Tom Beanal, chair of 
the Dewan Adat and acting chair of the Papua Presidium 
Council. 
A copy of the report is available at 
http://www.arts.usyd.edu.au/centres/cpacs/wpp.htm or from 
the Centre for Peace and Conflict Studies, University of 
Sydney, wpp@arts.usyd.edu.au 
Forum Papua set up 
A number of prominent figures in Indonesia have come 
together to set up a Forum Papua. The Forum's deputy chair, 
Marzuki Darusman, said its establishment had been 
inspired by what he called 'a lack of transparency' in the 
way in which the government dealt with the Aceh problem. 
Marzuki said: 'People feel they have been excluded by the 
government from the efforts to settle the Aceh problem. 
Now that the President has announced the government's 
intention of addressing the Papua issue, we hope that this 
forum will be capable of ensuring greater public participa-
tion.' 
As is known, a num4er of politicians in Indonesia were 
not at all happy with the Memorandum of Understanding 
signed between the Indonesian government and GAM on 15 
August. It may be that, lurking behind the decision to set 
up this F arum is the fear that another deal could be made 
with Papua. 
The initiators are certainly aware that Papua has won 
considerable international support, particularly in the US 
Congress, which is in the process of enacting legislation 
addressing the situation in West Papua [see box on page 15]. 
promote human rights. 
However, what happened? Indonesia has shown its 
immaturity by not implementing the democracy that it 
always claims and praises. Democracy in Indonesia is in 
danger, or perhaps it is more accurate to say that democracy 
is already dead and has never been alive. 
We raised our national flag on 1st December 2004; it was 
not intended to be a gun-battle with Indonesia. The orga-
nizers of the activity had sent a letter to the police inform-
ing them that the activity of raising the Bintang Kejora flag 
would be organized by Papuan students and the Papuan 
community in the form of a peaceful action, as part of a 
prayer meeting, and that the activity would take place in 
Abepura Trikora field. 
However, the police arrested the two of us [organizers], 
myself Yusak Pakage and brother Filep Karma. The 
Indonesian court judged us and accused us under laws 
against subversion [rebellion], which in reality contained 
racial discrimination and apartheid politicies of Indonesia 
towards the West Papuans. I was given a sentence of 1 O 
years imprisonment, whereas Filep Karma was given a 15 
year sentence. 
continued on page 23 
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Pastor leads struggle for peace and justice 
"The_ churches in P@ua can no longer remain silent if injustice and human rights abuses 
continue" Socratez Sofyan Yoman. 
Big Man speaks out the indigenous people of West Papua under special auton-
In Pacific terms, Revd. Sofyan Yoman is a Big Man. An omy, 14 May 2005). He alleges that special autonomy 
outspoken church leader and formidable critic of funds have been used to fund military operations [See 
Indones_ia's military occupation of West Papua, he has tren- Dateline, 16 March 2005, SBS TV Australia; transcript 
chant views about how to achieve peace and justice in his available at http://news.sbs.com.au/dateline or from 
homeland. TAPOL invited him to the UK in July to raise TAPOL]. 
awareness of the suffering of his people. He also visited Other issues of concern highlighted during the visit were 
Ireland as a guest of West Papua Action. the massive build-up of troops in West Papua [see 
Revd. Yoman is the President of the Alliance of Baptist http://tapol.gn.apc.org/reports/r050621 wpmil.htm], the 
~hurc~es of West Papua. With other religious leaders, omnipresence of intelligence officers, the demographic, 
mcludmg Protestants, Catholics, Muslims, social and economic changes caused by the 
and Hindus, he has worked tirelessly in the steady influx of large numbers of migrants from 
struggle for a better future for the Papuan other parts of Indonesia, the plight of political 
people. For many years the churches in West prisoners, and the historical injustice of West 
Papua maintained a relatively low profile, but Papua's incorporation into Indonesia following 
the situation has deteriorated so badly in the fraudulent Act of Free Choice in 1969. 
recent years that they have felt compelled to Revd. Yoman also made clear his opposi-
speak out. tion to foreign investment projects, especially the 
Revd. Yoman and his fellow religious lead- new Tangguh liquified natural gas project oper-
ers are prominent supporters of the 'Land o ated by BP Indonesia. His view is that the 
Peace' campaign. This rejects the increasing exploitation of Papua's natural resources brings 
militarisation of the territory and aims to no benefits to local people, it involves the 
provide space for political dialogue and create displacement of local communities, in some 
conditions in which human rights of all cate- cases causing terrible suffering, and invariably 
gories are fully protected. It involves all the majority of those employed are from Java and 
people living in West Papua and respects the elsewhere. He argues that such projects should 
diverse ethnic, racial and religious nature o be put on hold until West Papua is in a position to 
the society. Revd. Sofyan Yoman determine its own future. 
In his talks, Revd. Yoman provided graphic • 
accounts of widesdread abuses based on eye-witness Worldwide appeal 
accounts and information from churchgoers throughout the Revd. Yoman's powerful appeal for international support 
territory. He detailed incidents of summary executions, for ~est Papua was delivered to politicians, government 
torture, arbitrary arrests and detentions, disappearances and officials, church leaders, NGOs and members of the public. 
the forcible displacement of villagers from their homes and Several events, including a public meeting hosted by the 
livelihoods. Bishop of Oxford, the Rt. Revd. Richard Harries, were 
Survival threatened 
A member of the Lani tribe, Revd. Yoman was born in 
the village ofYiwenggame, Tiom in the Wamena district of 
West Papua's central highlands where recent military oper-
ations against defenceless villagers have claimed dozens of 
lives and made thousands homeless. 
He argued strongly that the systematic violence and 
oppression inflicted on the Papuan people amount to geno-
cide. Genocide may be difficult to prove in law and is not 
a term to be used lightly, but Revd. Yoman's point is that the 
· policies of the Indonesian government and the gross human 
rights violations perpetrated by its security forces represent 
a real threat to the survival of the Papuan people. 
The government's policy on special autonomy and the 
division of Papua into three or more provinces is a particu-
lar target for Revd. Yoman's criticism. In a paper published 
in May, he described the law on special autonomy as a 
cover for policies which perpetuate the misfortune and 
suffering of the indigenous people (Systematic genocide of 
organised by the Free West Papua Campaign, a vibrant and 
highly effective solidarity group based in Oxford. 
An Oxford Declaration calling for peace, justice and 
freedom was issued by Revd. Yoman and several prominent 
local supporters of West Papua, including the Bishop of 
Oxford, the Labour MP and former Cabinet minister, 
Andrew Smith, Liberal Democrat MP, Evan Harris, and 
Green MEP, Caroline Lucas. 
During his stay, Revd. Yoman attended the launch of a 
cross-party parliamentary group for West Papua organised 
by Andrew Smith MP. He also met parliamentarians in 
Ireland, prompting the hope that an international group of 
Parliamentarians for West Papua can soon be established. 
The visit ended with the Baptist World Centenary 
Congress in Birmingham. The event was attended by an 
estimated 12,000 people, many of whom were able to hear 
about West Papua for the first time. A two-page spread in 
the Baptist Times, circulated at the Congress gave promi-
nence to Revd. Yoman's call for worldwide help for the 
Papuan people. 
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Tanjung Priok acquittals a travesty 
The decision in July by a Jakarta appeals court to acquit 12 soldiers convicted of the 1984 'Tanjung 
Priok' massacre in which scores of Muslims died is a travesty of justice. It perpetuates the scourge of 
impunity, the hallmark of the Suharto dictatorship, and represents a bleak comment on the state of the 
rule of law in post-Suharto Indonesia 
All but one of the 12 soldiers were in any case serving 
exceptionally lenient sentences of two or three years impris-
onment for 'intentionally killing' civilians. A senior officer 
received a jail sentence of 10 years for the gross human 
rights violation of failing to prevent or halt the systematic 
killing of civilians. 
The defendants were all convicted last year by an ad hoc 
human rights court set up at the same time as the ad hoc 
court for East Timor whose proceedings have been widely 
condemned as a sham. The acquittals in the Tanjung Priok 
case mean that no-one has been convicted of the worst mass 
killing in Indonesia during the Suharto era outside of East 
Timor, Aceh and West Papua .. 
Those with command responsibility for the crime, 
including General Benny Murdani and possibly even 
President Suharto himself, were never brought to trial. The 
commander of Indonesia's special forces, Kopassus, Maj-
Gen Sriyanto Muntrasan, who in 1984 was the North 
Jakarta military commander, and a senior police officer 
were controversially acquitted at their original trials last 
year [see TAPOL Bulletin, No 177, p. 3]. 
Army provocation 
The massacre took place in the wake of a series of 
provocative actions by members of the Indonesian army in 
and around a mosque in Tanjung Priok, Jakarta's heavily-
populated port area. At the time, Indonesia's Muslim 
community was deeply exercised by the Suharto govern-
ment's decision to impose a Societies' Law which required 
all organisations to adopt the State ideology known as 
Pancasila, preventing organisations from proclaiming 
Islamic or other religious principles. 
Preachers in Tanjung Priok had been voicing their 
discontent with this decision during the early days of 
September 1984. On 7 September, soldiers entered a local 
prayer-house and ordered the removal of posters from the 
walls. They made a subsequent visit to ensure the posters 
had not been returned. Tempers flared among_ the congre-
gants while mosque officials attempted to calm things 
down. 
On 12 September, several preachers spoke at an open-air 
prayer meeting, following which a large crowd of around 
1,500 people marched to the local police headquarters to 
lodge a protest. They found themselves hemmed in on all 
sides as they approached their destination and gunfire was 
heard coming from all directions. Within minutes, there 
were scores of dead bodies while the less seriously injured 
fled the scene. 
According to local witnesses, at around midnight, an 
hour after the killings had begun, General Benny Murdani, 
commander-in-chief of the armed forces, came to inspect 
the scene. Several sources said he had been in the vicinity 
throughout the massacre, directing the operation. 
21st anniversary protest of the Tanjung Priok massacre 
On the following morning, General Murdani, together 
with Major-General Tri Sutrisno, the then military comman-
der of Jakarta, visited the area. They claimed that only nine 
people had died and fifty-three had been injured. They even 
alleged that local people had been armed with crowbars and 
chopping knives when they approached the police head-
quarters. 
'New Order' holds sway 
In a comment published shortly afterwards, based on 
information from lawyers for those charged in relation to 
the protest which preceded the massacre, TAPOL stated: 
'The impact of the incident on Tanjung Priok was shat-
tering. Virtually every family in the neighbourhood had lost 
relatives in the massacre. Estimates that hundreds had been 
killed soon gained currency and were mentioned in several 
reports (for example, Far Eastern Economic Review, 22 
November 1984). Some of those who survived have since 
put the number of dead at around six hundred but the offi-
cial cover up made it impossible to investigate the magni-
tude of the slaughter or check claims about secret mass 
graves where victims were buried without the knowledge of 
their families.' (TAPOL Publication: Indonesia: Muslims on 
Trial, April 1987) 
Former President Suharto, whose insistence on ideologi-
cal conformity to Pancasila created the atmosphere in which 
the massacre took place has yet to be held to account for his 
role. On the contrary, in May this year, the Indonesian 
Government decided that he should be allowed to spend the 
rest of his life without charge. 
The acquittals of soldiers involved in the massacre is a 
further sign that New Order elements and the New Order 
mentality still wield tremendous influence in Indonesia 
regardless of the democratic election of Susilo Bambang 
Yudhoyono as President. 
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A bad start for Ramadan 
The decision to raise the cost of fuel was taken just a few 
days before the start of Ramadan, the fasting month, a time 
when prices always go up anyway. The end of Ramadan 
Idul Fitri, is traditionally the time when people travel fa; 
and wide, to visit and pay their respects to parents. This 
year, they will find that these excursions will be an even 
heavier drain on the family purse. 
Role of the IMF 
Indonesia's economic problems go back to the late 1990s 
whe~ financial crises swept across South-East Asia, forcing 
massive cutbacks in state spending in Indonesia. This 
brought to an end the much-vaunted economic miracle 
under Suharto and forced the dictator into a humiliating 
plea to the International Monetary Fund for assistance. A 
photo widely publicised at the time in the national and inter-
national press, shows Suharto signing the contract with IMF 
chief, Michel Camdessus, towering behind him with his 
arms crossed. 
Although political pressure compelled the post-Suharto 
government ofHabibie to end its contract with the IMF, the 
policies introduced did not change. Economist Sugeng 
Bahagijo describes this as a 'home-grown' economic strat-
egy, because the IMF ideology still holds sway among 
economic policy makers. While these policies were 
welcomed by international financiers, writes Bahagijo, 
'they have exacerbated the plight of the poor who were 
already suffering from the crisis that had precipitated the 
IMF's intervention' . [Inside Indonesia, October-December 
2005] 
The IMF contract forced Indonesia to acknowledge the 
need to step up repayment of its huge foreign debt totalling 
$13 billion, more than three times the total public sector 
wages bill and eight times the education budget. This 
compelled the government to cut back on social services. As 
a result of these reversals in policy, at least 11 Om ill ion 
Indonesians - half the population of 220 million - still live 
on less than two dollars a day. 
High child mortality rate 
In a statement issued on 30 September, UNICEF 
lambasted Indonesia's deteriorating healthcare system for 
contributing to the deaths of 2,400 children a day. The head 
of the agency's office in Indonesia Gianfranco Rotigliano, 
described this as a 'shocking tragedy' caused by low immu-
nisation levels. As a result, nearly one million children are 
dying every year from preventable diseases such as tuber-
culosis, measles, pertussis, diphtheria and tetanus. 
Other reports point to 1.5 million malnourished children, 
while the country's infant and maternity mortality rate is the 
highest in Southeast Asia. 
In April, a child in West Java was diagnosed as having 
poliomyelitis, forcing an emergency vaccination 
programme. In the past few months, at least 240 children 
have been crippled by the disease. Indonesia has now been 
stripped of its ten-year polio-free status. 
As SBY approaches the first anniversary of his inaugura-
tion as President, he confronts a rapidly deteriorating econ-
omy and appalling deficiencies in education and the health-
care system. The fuel price increase and the Bali bombs 
could hardly have come at a worse time. 
Continued from page 4 
faced the risk of personal injury or even death. Solving this 
case and bringing the killers and their sponsors to justice is 
a big test for President Yudhoyono's government and its 
commitment to the rule oflaw.' [Human Rights Watch state-
ment. 7 September 2005] 
Fact-Finding Team's conclusions 
From December 2004 until June 2005, the murder was 
closely scrutinised by a Fact-Finding Team set up by 
President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono, with a broad 
mandate to question anyone, including officials of state 
institutions, who were required to partidpate fully in the 
investigations. After completing its six-month mandate on 
23 June, the Team delivered its report to the President and 
announced its conclusion that the murder was the result of 
a conspiracy. Since then, the investigations have been in the 
hands of the police force. 
Heading the Fact-Finding Team was a senior police 
detective, Brigadier-General Marsudhi Hanafi, who was 
quoted as saying, when the Team ended its mandate, that the 
'foam regarded Pollycarpus as the person 'who had opened 
the door'. 
But mystery still surrounds the findings of the Fact-
Finding Team as its report has not been made public. That 
is a matter for the President and as yet, he has chosen not to 
do so. 
Speaking to the press, Suciwati said that although she 
was pessimistic regarding the results of the Pollycarpus 
trial, she was pinning her hopes on the government. She 
called on the government to do the following: To publish 
the results of the investigations conducted by the TPF, to 
conduct a review of the activities of the police to see what 
they have accomplished so far, and if it becomes the evident 
that the police are not able to cope, to set up a new commis-
sion to make sure that the mastermind of the murder is 
revealed. She said that the TPF had mentioned several 
names in connection with the murder but these persons have 
not be taken to court. 
What motive could Pollycarpus possibly have had (to 
murder Munir), she asked. After all, he is only a pilot. 
1997-1998 kidnappings 
It is indeed ironic that, while the Munir murder trial is 
underway, there is renewed interest in the fate of twelve 
young activists who disappeared at the end of 1997. 
Investigations conducted by the National Human Rights 
Commission, Komnas HAM, have come to conclusion that 
these activists died at the hands of their kidnappers. A 
member of the Commission, Ruswiati Suryasaputra, told 
the press that they have enough evidence to prove that these 
forced disappearances were carried out with the support of, 
or using the power of state agencies, and therefore qualify 
as a gross human rights violation. Kornnas HAM says it has 
collected enough evidence to put the military officers 
responsible on trial in a human rights court. 
Munir was very much preoccupied with these disappear-
ances at the time, and it was this case that inspired him to 
set up Koutras, the Commission for Disappearances and the 
Victims of Violence. 
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Historic Balibo h·ouse restored 
In qctober 19~5, five Australian-based journalists were sent to investigate Indonesian military attacks 
against East Timor. Malcolm Rennie, a Scot, and Englishman Brian Peters joined Australians Greg 
Shack~eton and _Tony Stewart, and New Zealander Gary Cunningham to cover what was then the biggest 
em~rging event in the region - acts of aggression by a military dictatorship against a newly democratising 
~ociety, the ~ollapse of the decolinisation process in East Timor and the threat of invasion by neighbour-
ing Indonesia. 
In a border village called Balib6, Gary Cunningham filmed 
Greg Shackleton painting an Australian flag and the word 
AUSTRALIA with a rag dipped in red paint on the wall of 
the house in which they were sheltering. 
After filming an attack on Balib6 (16110/75) the five 
unarmed men dressed as civilians were murdered while 
surrendering to 100 red beret Kopassandha (Special Forces 
secret warfare) troops led by a Captain Yun us Yosfiah. He 
was promoted after Balib6 and he attended courses at the 
US Army's Command and General Staff College at Forth 
Leavenworth ( 1979) and the Royal College of Defence 
Studies in Britain ( 1989). 
~ight weeks later, Roger East, another Australian jour-
nalist was shot on the wharf in Dili following the invasion 
(7 Dec.) From this time on it was obvious that though our 
loss was great, it was as nothing compared to the Timorese: 
in the first four years of the Indonesian occupation 200,000 
people died. Out of a population of 680,000 these figures 
are apocalyptic. There was nothing I could do for Greg so 
I began to work to free the East Timorese. 
In fear of reprisals, the owner of the Balib6 house 
covered the Australian flag with several layers of paint. 
No one was ever charged with the murders. Three 
~ustralian inquiries were held. The first was exposed as 
madequate and the other two left many questions unan-
swered. A full judicial inquiry has never been held. 
Successive Australian governments, supported by an influ-
ential network of pro-Jakarta lobbyists, worked assiduously 
to preserve Indonesian sovereignty over East Timor. 
Successive British government's neglect of their own citi-
zens murdered in cold blood at Balib6 mirrored their heart-
less Australian counterparts. 
I have been to the UK many times in support of East 
Timer. Two interviews stand out in my memory: Tony Benn 
admitted that he had lied to Maureen Tolfree about the death 
of her brother, Brian Peters when he was her M.P. 'What my 
government told me was little more than Indonesian propa-
ganda.' Jeremy Hanley, a former Conservative Foreign 
Office minister, was a perfect example of weasel words. He 
did not even seem to realise that two of the murdered men 
were British! 
Greg's mother committed suicide. It was not the murders 
that destroyed her: it was Australian government official 
eagerness to blame the Balibo Five for their own murders 
and the fact that perjury was committed on behalf of the 
men who had murdered her only son. 
After the East Timorese voted for independence, public 
pressure forced John Howard to assemble a multinational 
force to guarantee East Timer's independence. 
Following 7 months of investigations, UN CivPol inves-
tigators in East Timor recommended the prosecution of 
Yunus Yosfiah and 2 others over the Balib6 murders. John 
Shirley and her son Evan in front of the restotred sign on the 
Balibo house 
Howard immediately recalled both Australian police offi-
cers conducting the investigation and his decision was 
e~f?rced despite the fact that both the officers and Sergio 
V1etra de Mello - then the UN Special Representative for 
the Secretary General to East Timor - appealed to him for 
time to complete the enquiries. 
In 2003, the Victorian government together with assis-
tance from the Balib6 House Trust World Vision 
. ' ' Multiplex, Channels 7 and 9 and the Australian Peace 
Keeping forces in East Timor, reconstructed and refur-
bishe~ the Balibo. Flag ~ouse to provide a Community 
Learnmg Centre with a wide range of programs including a 
creche, . sewing and c?oking classes, computer training, 
mechanics, carpentry, literacy, sport and music activities. It 
is a n:atter ~f g~eat pride to me personally that everything 
unavailable m T1mor at that time - every nail, every grain of 
sand, doors, windows, cans of paint was donated by 40 
Victorian businesses. 
Australian troops stationed at Balib6 volunteered to work 
on the house - after. doing the h~rd yards protecting the 
border they broke their backs workmg miracles. One Aussie 
pe~cekeeper dedicated t~ finding the flag that Greg had 
pamted, spent hours of pamful scrubbing the wall with steel 
wool. ~y first reactio~ when I saw the photograph was 
horror - it was a ghos~ image, a nasty reminder of the past, 
but I agreed to leave it exposed to allow the other families 
to decide its fate. 
T~elve Australian family members along with three 
family memb.ers ~rom Britain attended the opening by the 
Premier of V1ctona, Steve Bracks, the President of Timor-
Lest~, Xanana Gusmao and the Senior Minister for Foreign 
Affa~rs and Co-operation, Mr. Jose Ramos-Horta. Most 
movmg was the presence of hundreds of Timorese who had 
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walked since midnight from outlying districts in order to 
pay their respects . The ceremony was dedicated to all those 
who died including Roger East, Timorese civilians and 
members of the Resistance Army. 
My son was eight years old when Greg was murdered. 
Balib6 was the last place on earth he wanted to be. But he 
faced the ordeal. There were a lot of tears and great outpour-
ings of joy, from Timorese as well as us. For Evan 
Shackleton, the whole event and the uncovering of the flag 
was a kind of resurrection - for 28 years he had suffered 
rec:urring nightmares. He hasn't had one since. 
The Community Leaming Centre is thriving. Additional 
buildings have been built to house the carpentry and 
mechanical workshops along with separate creche, sporting 
and music facilities. For me the flag holds no immediate 
horror, like the restored house it is a symbol of renewal and 
of hope for a better future for the Timorese nation. It repre-
sents my son's release and promises a kind ofresurrection -
like an ancient cave painting - it is a precious remnant from 
the past - a sad and ghostly artefact of a vile and unfinished 
business. 
In 2000 Maureen Tolfree asked the NSW Coroner to 
hold a formal inquest into the death of Brian Peters, one of 
the Balib6 Five, as he was a resident in NSW. Judge 
Abernethy has agreed to hold an inquest later this year. 
Shirley Shackleton, 19th September 2005 
Yusak Pakage statement, continued from page 18 
The eyes of the Papuans and the international community 
have seen and are continuing to witness the racist 
Indonesian court system. In this case Indonesia has violated 
its own 1945 constitution and several international conven-
tions. 
One point of the 1945 constitution,violated by Indonesia, 
is the preamble which says that: "Indeed, independence is 
the right of any nation and therefore any colonialization in 
this world must be eliminated because it is against human-
ity and justice". 
Indonesia has also violated the International Covenant on 
Civil and Political Rights of 16 December 1966. 
The laws that were proposed by the founding fathers of 
the Unitary State of Indonesia (the 1945 constitution) and 
the conventions that have been agreed by the global 
community are always violated every time Indonesia 
responds to the struggle of West Papuans against its colo-
nialism. 
Through their racist courts which "rubber stamp" 
Indonesia's policies of oppression, we Papuans who really 
fight to defend our people are always considered g~ilty and 
are given heavy penalties. However, those Indonesians ~ho 
shamefully kill our people and who should be categonzed 
as serious human rights abusers are always set free. 
The Indonesian colonial court system is only a ritual and 
simply a theatre created to accuse those who defend the 
tortured people. However, it praises those who defend the 
killers whose bloody hands were used to kill us. 
The Papuans must realise that when Indonesia violates its 
own constitution (the 1945 constitution), it actually gives us 
political energy. Our strength is ~n t~eir inc~nsist_ency i_n 
implementing 'their 1945 constltut10n, which is theu 
national foundation. This is the background that I have 
prepared. Thank you for your w~llingne~s to read it a~d to 
spread it around the Papuan and mternattonal community 
BOOK REVIEW 
A Not-So-Distant Horror: Mass 
Violence in East Timor 
By Joseph Nevins 
2005, Cornell University Press; 273 pages . 
The tragedy of East Timor is firmly located in the impe-
rial projects of the world's most powerful countries -
notably the US, but also Australia, Japan, the UK, New 
Zealand and others - according to this compelling account 
of the tiny country's inspiring struggle for independence. 
While those most directly responsible for the violence 
and suffering inflicted on the East Timorese people 
throughout the period of Indonesia's brutal occupation from 
197 5 to 1999 were the Indonesian army, its military and 
political leaders, and its militia proxies, Joseph Nevins 
convincingly argues that blame must also lie with those 
western countries that provided Indonesia with crucial mili-
tary, economic and diplomatic support. 
They were guilty not only of active complicity in the 
dreadful crimes perpetrated against the Timorese, but also 
of maintaining the less visible forms of structural or institu-
tionalised violence inherent in a world order which favours 
the strong (and the friends of the strong such as Indonesia) 
against the weak. · 
The latter form of oppression includes maintaining crip-
pling global socioeconomic inequalities. In this sense, 
suggests Nevins, East Timor's independence has had its 
'painful limitations'. The struggle for self-determination 
and sovereignty over natural resources, therefore, goes on. 
This is particularly the case in relation to the oil reserves in 
the Timar Sea, estimated to be worth between $12 and $20 
billion over the next three decades, which Australia is intent 
on appropriating. 
The strength of Nevins' account and analysis derives 
from his experiences as a long-time advocate for East Timor 
and regular visitor to the territory since 1992. He vividly 
juxtaposes the horror and the normality of the terror. Thus 
in 1992, just a few months after the horrific Santa Cruz 
cemetery massacre, people were going about their lives -
attending a wedding, playing volleyball, going to the 
market - as they would almost anywhere in the world, but 
the level of fear and tension was palpable, he recounts. 
This was because 'the brutality in East Timor was of an 
established sort, one that comes about when a purveyor of 
violence has sufficiently won the upper hand, when the 
stronger party can implement its policies through seemingly 
normal practices... The occupation had become institution-
alized. The violence was in the structures built upon the 
corpses of the dead and the collective trauma of those who 
had survived.' 
Nevins examines the US role at length, but also touches 
on the part played by the UK, which was one oflndonesia's 
largest arms suppliers during its occupation of East Timar. 
The 40th anniversary of the bloody events which led to 
General Suharto's seizure of power in 1965/66 has just 
passed and Nevins reminds us that British support for the 
Indonesian military dates from that dark period in 
Indonesia's history. 
He provides us with a useful insight into the way in 
which power corrupts moral principles through the career of 
the late Robin Cook, Labour Foreign Secretary between 
1997 and 2001. In 1978, as a young MP, Cook had written 
a scathing critique of continued on back page 
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arms sales to repressive regimes being particularly disturbed 
by the sale that year of the first batch of British Aerospace 
Hawk aircraft to Jakarta. In 1994, he told parliament that 
Hawk aircraft had been 'observed on bombing runs in East 
Timar in most years since 1984'. 
As Foreign Secretary under Tony Blair, he changed his 
tune completely. He denied saying that Hawks were opera-
tional in East Timar and controversially allowed the delivery 
to Jakarta of more Hawk aircraft, armoured vehicles and 
other military equipment licensed for export by the previous 
Tory government. A picture of Cook shaking hands with 
Suharto then bizarrely appeared in the Labour government's 
first annual human rights report in 1998. 
In his published diaries, discussing the contested sale of 
Hawk spares to Zimbabwe, Cook commented: 'In my time I 
came to learn that the Chairman of British Aerospace 
appeared to have the key to the garden door to Number 10 
[the Prime Minister's residence]. Certainly I never once 
knew Number 10 to come up with any decision that would 
be incommoding to British Aerospace, even when they came 
to bitterly regret the public consequences, as they did in 
overruling me on the supply of Hawk spares to Zimbabwe.' 
['The Point of Departure: Diaries from the Front Bench', 
Robin Cook, 2003] 
This exemplifies the immense influence and political 
power wielded by arms companies within government, but 
interestingly does not say anything about Cook being over-
ruled on the supply of Hawks to Indonesia (for more on 
government/arms industry links, see Campaign Against 
Arms Trade's 'Call the shots' campaign at 
http://www.caat.org. uk/ campaigns/ calltheshots/). 
Nevins does credit the Blair government with raising East 
Timor's diplomatic profile, pressing Indonesia to respect 
human rights, and as president of the EU, facilitating the 
visit of a high-level delegation in June 1998. However, he 
rightly makes the point that whereas these initiatives were 
significant, London's continuing military and economic 
support for Jakarta was likely to have sent the message that 
it was 'business as usual'. 
The book considers in some detail the difficult question of 
whether western governments could have done more to 
prevent the violence and scorched-earth devastation of East 
Timar in 1999 and concludes that had they acted in a manner 
consistent with their international obligations, it is likely that 
the TNI would not have gone as far as it did. 
The latter chapters deal with the critical issue of account-
ability: how false representations of the past lay the founda-
tions for injustice; the role of truth and reconciliation 
commissions; the absence of any notion that countries that 
aided and abetted Jakarta's crimes should be held account-
able; and the lack of international political will and desire to 
force the issue of justice. This matter seems to have stalled 
yet again with the UN Security Council and Secretary-
General dragging their heels over their response to a 
Commission of Experts' report completed in May 2005 [see 
TAPOL Bulletin, No 179, p. 11]. 
Nevins correctly asserts that the impunity enjoyed by the 
world's powerful for their complicity in the violence perpe-
trated by the Indonesian military increases the likelihood 
that such shameful conduct will reoccur (as it has in Iraq and 
elsewhere). The whitewash of the military's ugly history in 
East Timar also has profoundly detrimental implications for 
the populations of restive regions in Indonesia such as West 
Papua, where the TNI has perpetrated widespread and ongo-
ing atrocities, and insidiously undermines Indonesia's fragile 
transition to democracy. 
Paul Barber 
New Human Rights Watch Report 
Always on Call 
Abuse and Exploitation of Child Domestic 
Workers in Indonesia 
HRW Index No.: CJ707 
June 20, 2005 
This 74-page report documents how Indonesian chil-
dren as young as 12 work 14 to 18 hours a day, seven 
days a week, without a day off. They are also forbid-
den from leaving their place of employment or 
contacting their families. 
Human Rights Watch documented how girls are physi-
cally, psychologically and sexually abused by their 
employers. Most earn less than 500 rupiah (or five 
U.S. cents) an hour. Labour recruiters, neighbors, rela-
tives and others lure girls from rural areas or poor 
urban areas with false promises of high wages, the 
chance to attend school in the city, and limited job 
responsibilities. 
Available for download -
http://hrw. orglreports/2005/indonesia0605/ 
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